Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country by Garnett, Richard W.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 72 Number 3 Article 1 
1996 
Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-
Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country 
Richard W. Garnett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Garnett, Richard W. (1996) "Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, 
and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 
1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol72/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
ONCE MORE INTO THE MAZE: UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ,
TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION, AND FEDERAL CONSPIRACY
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
RICHARD W. GARNM-r*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. LopezI reflects a new appreciation 2 for "first prin-
ciples" of federalism,3 subsidiarity, 4 and localism.5 Our Constitution, the
* Law Clerk to Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
(1995-96) and to Chief Justice William Rehnquist (1996-present). J.D., Yale Law School (1995);
B.A., Duke University (1990). I would like to thank Nicole Stelle Garnett, Eric S. Miller, and Brian
Kalt for their suggestions, assistance, and insight; and Donald Wharton, Jerilyn DeCoteau, and the
Federal Public Defender's office in Phoenix, Arizona, for introducing me to and instructing me in
Federal Indian Law. The opinions expressed in this Article are neither Chief Judge Arnold's nor
Chief Justice Relnquist's.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. See Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REV. 78, 80
(1995) (noting "revival" of republican anti-federalism "[a]fter a half-century of relative complacen-
cy about the increasing federalization of lawmaking power"). It remains to be seen, however,
whether this reawakening will lead to a "revolution." See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE
141 (1995) (suggesting that the "impact of [Lopez] on broader questions of federal power will be limit-
ed"); Charles Fried, Forward: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34 (1995) ("The Lopez case is a
perfect example not of revolution ... but rather of adjudication precisely in the ordinary course ....")
(footnotes omitted); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 676 (1995) ("Lopez
marks a minor constitutional revolution .... The practical effect of the revolution in the courts,
however, will be small."). So far, Lopez-inspired arguments have met with little success. See United
States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Lopez challenge to Freedom of Access to
Clinics Act), petition for cert. filed, (Aug 6, 1996) (No. 96-5615); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791
(5th Cir. 1995) (upholding law prohibiting possession or transfer of machine guns), reh'g en banc
granted, 78 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding law
against possession by felon of firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding carjacking statute does not exceed Commerce Clause
power), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995). But see, eg., United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360
(D. Ariz. 1995) (holding Child-Support Recovery Act unconstitutional under Lopez) rev'd, 95 F.3d 78
799163 (9th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm the vitality of
state sovereignty in our federal system. See, e4g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
(finding that Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from abrogating the States' sovereign immunity
via the Indian Commerce Clause).
3. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) ("We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote, '[tihe
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."' (citations omitted)).
4. See Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39, 40 (reviewing
MIctAL J. SANDEL), DEMOCRACY's DISCoNrmr: AMERICA IN SEARCH OFAPUBUC PPHuOSOPHY (1996))
(describing "subsidiarity" as "the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that can
perform them adequately"). Subsidiarity is an important principle in the law of the European Com-
munity and in Catholic social thought. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Serious-
ly: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994);
CATEcHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1883 (1994).
5. Localism reflects a conviction, widely shared by the Framers, that "those closest to the matters
to be dealt with best knew what ought to be done." MAx BawpOp, THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
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Court in Lopez reminded us, both presumes and protects splintered and
diffused, yet balanced, sovereignty and power. 6 Now, there is always the
danger of reading too much into one case; the holding in Lopez was
actually quite narrow. 7 But, on the other hand, Lopez may be one of
those cases that means more than it says. 8 The real drama of the case,
after all, was in the Justices' finessing of competing claims to power, set
against the backdrop of the Court's concern for balance in the "sensi-
tive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." 9 This
backdrop may be even more rich and textured than the Lopez Court
realized or acknowledged. Remember, there are other political commu-
nities, beside the States, whose "sensitive relations" with the federal
government are structured and regulated by our Constitution. 10
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." 11 Though often ignored in discussions of constitu-
tional federalism, 12 the Indian Tribes remain distinct, albeit "depen-
dent," 13 sovereigns, and retain inherent, though limited, powers of
15 (1959). Justice Black may have put it best:
It is always time to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and composed of too
great a diversity of peoples for any one of us to have the wisdom to establish the rules by
which local Americans must govern their local affairs.... [E]xperience in making local
laws by local people themselves is by far the safest guide for a nation like ours to follow.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 547-48 (1968).
6. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.") (quoting Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Flederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion
of sovereign power.") (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)).
7. The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to
"knowingly . .. possess a firearm [in] ... a school zone," exceeded Congress's power to "regulate
Commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citations omitted).
8. The Justices themselves appeared unsure what they had wrought. Compare id. at 1634
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing holding as "necessary though limited") with id. at 1657
(Souter, J., dissenting) (warning that "[niot every epochal case has come in epochal trappings"). On
the importance of judicial candor in clearly and accurately describing the holding and significance of
constitutional cases, see generally, JosEH GOLDSTEtN, THE ITrrLuIBtaLE CONsTmmtnON (1992).
9. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3. (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973),
quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
10. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56
U. CHi. L. Rav. 671, 690-701 (1989) (discussing complex relation between the Tribes and the United
States).
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
12. But see Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between
the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L.
REv. 617 (1994); Resnik, supra note 10, at 702.
13. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (noting that Indian Tribes are
"domestic dependent nations" related to the United States as a "ward to his guardian").
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self-government. 14 Like the States, the Tribes enact laws, operate courts,
and exercise jurisdiction.15 And, just as surely as creeping nationalism
and the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction threaten the feder-
al-state balance, these trends also threaten the Tribes' precarious posi-
tions as independent cultural, political, and nomic communities. 16 What
hope then, if any, might Lopez, and the reawakening it has inspired, hold
out for the Tribes and their hopes for more vibrant sovereignty?17
This Article examines the problem of federal criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country' 8 through the focused lens of the federal conspiracy
statute, 19 and it discusses the threat this jurisdiction may pose to the
Tribes' integrity. The goal of this Article is to contribute to a Lopez-
like reappreciation for the importance of decentralized and limited
criminal jurisdiction in Federal Indian Law 20 and for the Tribes' consti-
tutional importance and dignity. But first, a caveat: strictly speaking,
Lopez means next-to-nothing for the Tribes. The Supreme Court has
held that the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce
Clause are, analytically and functionally, completely distinct, 21 and I will
14. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
425-26 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("A tribe's inherent sovereignty, however, is divested to the extent it
is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, that is, to the extent it involves a tribe's 'external
relations."') (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (holding that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government ... is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes"); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (noting that Indian Tribes cannot exercise their
powers in a manner that conflicts with the United States' "overriding sovereignty").
15. See generally Symposium, Indian Tribal Courts and Justice, JuDIcATU, Nov.-Dec. 1995.
16. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 951 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J., dissenting)
("[D]isregarding the jurisdiction of tribal courts ... undermines their authority ... and to that extent
imperils the political integrity of the tribe."), cert. granted, No. 95-1872, 1996 WL 282565 (U.S. Oct.
1, 1996); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (noting that federal encroachment on
tribe's ability to "punish its members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially from tribal
self-government").
17. So far, not many cases have presented Lopez issues in cases concerning the Indian Tribes.
Expect more in the future, though. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698,706-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act exceeds Congress's
Commerce Clause power) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996); United States v. Finn, 911 F. Supp. 372,
373 (D. Minn. 1995) (rejecting Lopez challenge and holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1163, which prohibits
theft from a tribal organization, "is a valid exercise of Congress's plenary power granted under the
Indian Commerce Clause").
18. "Indian Country" is a term of art, and includes "(a) all land within the limits of any
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government .... (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States .... and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles
to which have not been extinguished, including all rights-of-way running through the same." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (1994).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
20. By "Federal Indian Law" I mean federal laws about Native Americans, laws which regulate
the Indian Tribes and which structure the relations between the Tribes and individual Native Ameri-
cans, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. The Tribes themselves, of course, usually
have their own laws and courts.
21. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("It is ... well
established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different
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not argue otherwise here. The Tribes are not States.22 Indeed, the Tribes
are conquered nations, not confederated former colonies; the Indian
Nations are historically prior t023 and, one might argue, of greater
intrinsic dignity than the States. 24 Thus, while Lopez's narrow holding
may not "control" any cases about federal criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country, Lopez does remind us, again, that "[t]he Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers," 25 that the "States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law," 26 and that Congress's ability to "change ... the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction" 27 is limited. These are
"first principles." What do they mean for the Tribes? To be sure, the
accelerating "federalization" of criminal law is old news 28 and Lopez
probably cannot undo this process. But the reawakening of interest in
first principles which Lopez has inspired should lead to new concern for
both the general problem of expanding federal criminal jurisdiction and
the specific problem of its expansion in Indian Country.
applications. In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free
trade among the States . . , the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian Affairs." (citations omitted)).
22. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) ("Tribal reserva-
tions are not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacher-
ous to import to one notions ... that are properly applied to the other."); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (noting that Framers considered Tribes, States, and foreign nations as
"entirely distinct"). In some contexts, though, the Tribes are treated as though they were States. See,
e.g., Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982 § 202, 26 U.S.C. § 7871(a) (1994) ("[A]n
Indian tribal government shall be treated as a State .... ).
23. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMEmCAN I NDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112 (1987) (noting that tribal governments are "pre constitu-
tional").
24. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (discussing relations between
Cherokee Nation and Georgia the and history of the Indian Tribes, and noting that the "Indian nations
ha[ve] always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original
natural rights").
25. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
26. Id. at 1631 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993), quoting Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that
the States' "one transcendent advantage" over the national government is "the ordinary administration
of criminal and civil justice").
27. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1631 n.3 (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,411-12 (1973),
quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
28. Justice Stevens, when Judge Stevens, once observed that "[tihe extraordinary growth of
federal criminal litigation poses a serious threat to the quality of federal justice; moreover, this growth
may not only reflect but also contribute to the continuing transfer of power from the several states to
the national government.... [W]e have no desire to accelerate this trend unnecessarily .... United
States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 55 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). See
generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HAsTINOs L. J. 1135 (1995); Jay M. Cohen & David J. Fried, United States v. Lopez and the Federal-
ization of Criminal Law, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 23; Gregory W. O'Reilly & Robert Drizin,
United States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance by Maintaining the States' Role as the
"Immediate and Visible Guardians" of Security, 22 J. LEOIS, 1 (1996) (discussing Lopez's possible
effects on the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction).
436
TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
This Article examines these problems in the context of the federal
conspiracy statute. Why conspiracy? First, conspiracy, the "darling of
the prosecutor's nursery," 29 has what Justice Jackson called a "tendency
.. to expand itself to the limit of its logic." 30 The conspiracy statute's
notoriously ambitious reach has long made it an especially potent
weapon in the hands of federal prosecutors. In addition, the crime of
conspiracy has an unsavory history; it is closely associated with political
oppression and vendetta. 3 1 In Indian Law, this history is especially
instructive, because many federal prosecutions in Indian Country have
political significance. Finally, as we will see, the United States Courts of
Appeals are split over the extent of the federal conspiracy statute's reach
in Indian Country. Is the conspiracy statute "generally applicable" in
Indian Country, just like anyplace else, or do the principles, history, and
purposes of Federal Indian Law point to a more restrictive interpreta-
tion? At first, the disagreement may seem to be only one of emphasis,
and the courts' differences only minor. But such technicalities have
important consequences for tribal sovereignty, because they reflect a
deeper rift at the level of first principles. In Federal Indian Law, each
loose end calls for quick resolution because each unresolved question
represents a point of tension, a potential locus of conflict, between
communities.
This Article may not tie up this loose end to everyone's satisfaction,
but it should contribute to a better understanding of federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country, through detailed examination of the
relevant caselaw, animated by reflection on first principles. Part II lays
out a few, very general, "big ideas" concerning the crucial connection
between jurisdiction -especially criminal jurisdiction- and community
self-determination. Part III provides specific background, and introduc-
es the complicated rubric of federal criminal jurisdiction in general, and
of jurisdiction in Indian Country in particular. Part IV examines the
possible bases, or "hooks," for federal conspiracy jurisdiction over
intra-Indian offenses in Indian Country, and suggests that no adequate
hook exists. Part V reviews and evaluates the different approaches to this
problem taken by the United States Courts of Appeals, and suggests that
the rule which best respects tribal sovereignty, and Lopez's first princi-
ples, is one that places the burden on the United States to justify prosecu-
tions for violations of "generally applicable" federal criminal laws in
Indian Country by proving an overriding national interest in doing so.
29. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1925).
30. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting BEN-
JAmm N. CARDozo, THE NATURE op THE JuDIciAL PRocEss 51 (1921)).
31. Id. at 448,450 (noting conspiracy's roots in Star Chamber).
1996] 437
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Part VI closes with a few thoughts about the broader significance of
Lopez and the principles of subsidiarity for the criminal side of Federal
Indian Law.
II. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND COMMUNITY
The next Part sketches the complicated statutory and constitutional
framework for criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. But first, a few
preliminary thoughts on the often unappreciated importance of jurisdic-
tional issues, and the special significance of criminal jurisdiction in
particular.
A. JURISDICTION IS POWER
Jurisdiction is power, and the sovereignty of any community, state,
or nation is bounded by the reach of its courts and laws, that is, by its
jurisdiction. 32 Put differently, a community's political authority is only
as robust as its jurisdiction. 33 After all, as the court at King's Bench
observed nearly five hundred years ago, "it is not of necessity to obey
him who is not Judge of the cause, no more than it is a mere stranger." 34
Our Constitution's federal structure reflects this principle: the Framers
limited federal power, in part, by limiting federal jurisdiction.35
Because jurisdiction defines and is essential to sovereignty, commu-
nities covet and guard it. Therefore, it is no surprise that much of the
drama in Federal Indian Law is, and has always been, about jurisdic-
tion. 36 The Indian Tribes understand what may seem to be mundane
32. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (restrictions on States' jurisdiction are
consequence of limitation on states' power); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1877) (noting judg-
ment rendered without jurisdiction is an "absolute nullity" and "contrary to the first principles of jus-
tice"); A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 944 (8th Cir. 1996) (Gibson, J. dissenting) ("[T]he
power to adjudicate everyday disputes occurring within a nation's own territory is among the most
basic and indispensable manifestations of sovereign power."), cert. granted, No. 95-1872, 1996 WL
282565 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996).
33. See A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 951 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (noting importance of tribal
civil jurisdiction to tribal self-government and concluding that "disregarding the jurisdiction of tribal
courts, which play a vital role in tribal self-government, undermines their authority over reservation
affairs and to that extent imperils the political integrity of the tribe"). See generally Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Braid of Feathers: Pluralism, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and the Importance of Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. Rav. 557 (1996) (reviewing FRANK POMMERSHIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS
(1995)).
34. The Case of the Marshal seq, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1039 (K.B. 1613).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
36. Justice John Marshall's most memorable and significant opinions relating to Native Ameri-
cans hinged on jurisdictional issues. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831)
(holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Cherokee Nation's request for injunction against cer-
tain Georgia laws since Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832) (granting petition for habeas corpus and holding Georgia lacked jurisdiction
in Cherokee territory); see also Resnik, supra note 10, at 729-34 (describing relationship between
tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction).
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jurisdictional disputes as what they really are-skirmishes in a "very real
and very intense struggle for power." 37 This struggle was evident in
Worcester v. Georgia,38 in which Justice Marshall insisted that, because
the Cherokee Nation was sovereign, "the laws of Georgia [could] have
no force" 39 in Cherokee Territory. The Cherokee Nation's jurisdiction,
emanating from its sovereignty, trumped and excluded Georgia's
jurisdiction. The story has not changed much. Ever since Worcester, the
Indian Tribes' precarious status as sovereign nations has been measured
by the vitality of their own jurisdiction and by their ability to resist the
jurisdictional encroachments of rival state and federal sovereigns.40
B. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND COMMUNITY INTEGRITY
If jurisdiction is power, criminal jurisdiction reflects and enables a
special kind of power: the power to communicate, promulgate, and
enforce a community's morality, values, and ideals.4 1 Communities
speak their morality through their criminal law. As James Fitzjames
Stephen put it:
[T]he sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the
public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It
converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise
be a transient sentiment.... [T]he infliction of punishment by
law gives definite expression and a solemn ratification and
justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission
of the offence .... 42
But, as Stephen might put it, not all communities hate the same
thing. For instance, when Congress passes one of its Omnibus Crime
Bills, it often substitutes the moral commitments of the nation as a whole,
distilled and homogenized through elections and the legislative process,
for the commitments of particular states.43 This often-voiced criticism of
37. DAVID H. GETcHEs ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERiALS 459 (1993 ed.).
38. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
39. Id. at 561.
40. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:
The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REv. 951 (1975).
41. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) (noting that tribal criminal juris-
diction promotes the Tribes' "significant interest in maintaining orderly relations among their members
and in preserving tribal customs and traditions"); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians:
Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 263 (1984) ("[A] tribe having governing
powers over its own territory can better maintain a cohesive culture."); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336, 348 (1971) (noting that "criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community").
42. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (London,
MacMillan, 1883).
43. For example, although numerous federal criminal statutes call for the death penalty, see, for
example, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (authorizing death penalty for intentional killings by those engaged in a
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the federalization of criminal law44 applies, with similar if not greater
force, to the ever-expanding reach of federal criminal law into Indian
Country. After all, we celebrate the cultural diversity of our States and
cities, and our federalism was designed, in part, as a vehicle for protect-
ing that diversity. How much greater is the diversity between the cultural
heritages of the Tribes and those of the, relatively speaking, homogenous
States? Like other normative communities, the Tribes "give birth to
meaning,"45 they generate duties and rights for their members.46 When
the federal government asserts criminal jurisdiction over Indians, it, in a
way, imposes the "white man's morality," 47 the morality of a different,
though overlapping,48 community. This second-guessing of a commu-
nity's self-expression through criminal law, whether done to a State or to
a Tribe, is, unavoidably, paternalistic and, therefore, inconsistent with a
robust understanding of self-determination.
The criminal law49 purports to proclaim and vindicate the particular
moral commitments of particular communities.5 0 Criminal law is
therefore, in some sense, "better" when it speaks from and for the
locality because it is in local communities where morality is generated
and where character is formed.51 Because criminal law plays an especial-
ly important role in this generation and formation, it is crucial that
"continuing criminal enterprise"), several States do not permit capital punishment. Scholars have
often noted that one of the virtues of federalism is that it permits the States to create diverse social,
political, and moral climates, and to express their own particular commitments. See Debora Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1,8-9 (1988); SHAmIRo, supra note 2, at 75-106.
44. See, e.g., Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of
Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994).
45. Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1,57 (1989).
46. Robert Cover called the creative process through which a community speaks its moral com-
mitments through law, "jurisgenesis." See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv.
L. REv. 4, 11-19 (1983) (discussing jurisgenesis).
47. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
48. Native Americans are, of course, United States citizens. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
692 (1990) (noting that all Indians "were made citizens in 1924").
49. Of course, all law, not just the criminal law, articulates moral commitments. Environmental
regulation, safety regulation, even tax law, can express and advance a community's moral agenda.
But, it seems to me, this moral function is primary in criminal law; the core concern of the criminal law
is defining and punishing what the community deems malum in se.
50. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978), the Court held that the
Tribe's inherent sovereignty did not include jurisdiction over non-Indians. And in Duro, 495 U.S. at
679, the Court held that the Tribe lacked jurisdiction over non-member Indians. (Congress eventually
overturned this holding by statute.) Both these cases recognize the tie between the moral authority and
legal reach of the criminal law and membership in the community for which that criminal law speaks.
51. The most inspiring scholar on this point is, I think, Professor Thomas Shaffer. See Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging ,49 OHIo ST. LJ. 703 (1988); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal
Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963 (1987).
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criminal law remain true to principles of localism.52 Indeed, the criminal
law cannot long survive unmoored from the relevant communities'
morality. 53
Thus, the moral independence of local nomic communities is not a
burden to be tolerated or overcome, but is, instead, an essential part of
how we build personal integrity and moral freedom as rooted, situated,
and well-constituted selves.54 What's more, the sovereignty of a commu-
nity that is unable to articulate, promulgate, and vindicate its moral
commitments through the criminal law, to engage in "jurisgenesis," is,
to that extent, diminished. That community is less able to "speak its
values" 5 5 and to perpetuate these values through character-formation.
As one scholar recently noted, "tribal sovereignty creates an arena of
tribal choice in which to articulate legal values and establish normative
tribal frames of reference." 56 The expansion of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion threatens this "arena."
III. MAPPING THE MAZE: FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Federal Indian Law is complex and federal criminal jurisdiction
especially complex. 57 Leading scholars have observed that the field is a
52. In this sense, criminal law is like domestic relations law, family law, or education in being an
item of particularly local concern. See United States v. Lopez. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 1632 (1995)
(noting that the States have historically been the primary legislators in criminal law, family law, and
education). For more on the importance of localism in our federal structure, and for an excellent
discussion of how federalism preserves the relation between the substantive law and the moral
commitments of local communities, see Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PENN. L.
REv. 1787, 1794-1805 (1995) ("Localism implicitly recognized meaningful civic engagement as an
essential condition for the exercise of political authority over matters going to the moral life of the
community."). Dailey argues "for reclaim[ing] localism as a constitutional value of fundamental
importance." Id. at 1795. She ably defends, from a communitarian perspective, the role of local
values and norms, of local conceptions of the good life, in our federal design.
53. See Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE LJ. 987, 997 (1940)
(noting that the criminal law "can not be exercised for any long time unless the law itself is felt by a
large part of the community to be in harmony with their prevailing customs and moral views"). See
generally PAUL H. RoBINsoN & JOHN M. DAR.LEY, JusTIcE, LiAmurry, AND BLAME: CoMMuNrrY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (analyzing discrepancies between community standards and criminal
law and arguing that such discrepancies lead to losses of moral credibility).
54. See generally AviAM SoIER, LAW AND T1E COMPANY WE KEEP (1995) (emphasizing the im-
portant role communities play in character formation).
55. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 373 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[E]ach criminal
conviction ... represents a pronouncement by the State that the defendant has engaged in conduct
warranting the moral condemnation of the community.").
56. FRANK PoMMERStuIM, BRAm OF FEATHERS 194-95 (1995).
57. Other scholars have provided much more elaborate and detailed road maps. See FELIX S.
COHEN, H AMOOK oFAMEcAN INDIAN LAW 47-206, 281-386 (1982 ed.); Robert N. Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503
(1976).
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"maze,"58 a "crazy-quilt" 59 woven from sometimes ill-matched federal,
state, and tribal strands. 60 These tangled intricacies should come as no
surprise. The maze is the inevitable by-product of multiple sovereignties
exercising multiple powers derived from multiple sources. While the
United States' power flows from treaties with the Tribes and from the
Constitution,61 the States claim authority under federal grants, their own
inherent sovereignty, and their own early treaties with the Tribes,62 and
the Tribes' powers derive from their inherent aboriginal sovereignty. 63
What's more, in any criminal case involving Native Americans or Indian
Country,64 jurisdiction depends on the precise location of the events, the
particular crime alleged, and the race of the victim and accused. 65 The
maze's Byzantine rules simply reflect the unique nature of the federal-In-
dian relationship, a relationship "perhaps unlike that of any other two
people[s] in existence." 66
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES
Federal criminal jurisdiction, unlike state or tribal jurisdiction, does
not exist a priori. We should think of federal and, where it exists, state67
58. Clinton, supra note 57, at 504.
59. Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants'
Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REv. 387, 387 (1974).
60. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 1121 (1993) (federal criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country results from "a complex patchwork of federal, state and tribal law[s]" (quoting Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,680 n.1 (1990))). See also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUrSHELL 97 (2d ed. 1988) ("The most complex problems in the field of Indian Law arise in jurisdic-
tional disputes among the federal government, the tribes and the states.").
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cls. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes .... "); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. cls. 1-2 ("The President ... shall
have power ... to make Treaties .... ").
62. See Clinton, supra note 57, at 504.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) ("Before the coming of the
Europeans, the tribes were self-governing sovereign political communities .... Like all sovereign
bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe laws .... " (citation omitted)).
64. The term "Indian Country" is a term of art. See generally Clinton, supra note 57, at 507-13
(discussing meaning of "Indian Country").
65. See generally COHEN, supra note 57, at 19-27 (discussing definition of "Indian"); Clinton,
supra note 57, at 513-20 (noting that "the question of Indian status for purposes of criminal jurisdiction
is perplexing").
66. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); see also United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (noting that "[tihe relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the
United States ... [is] an anomalous one and of a complex character"). I do not discuss, in this article,
the similarly complex character of the relationship between the indigenous peoples and governments
of other nations. See Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States
Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643 (1991); Dianne Otto, A Question of Law or Politics?
Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 65 (1995).
67. The States' criminal enforcement role in Indian Country is limited. See COHEN, supra note 57,
at 270-71, 349-61 (discussing jurisdiction). But Justice Marshall's statement in Worcester v. Georgia,
that state laws can "have no force" in Indian Country, is not as true as it once was. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 561 (1832). In 1953, Congress handed over limited criminal jurisdiction to some States under
Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, thereby terminating the federal role with respect to certain Tribes.
Public Law 280 also eliminated all tribal criminal authority in the relevant States. On the other hand, in
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criminal jurisdiction as having been "carved out ' of Indian jurisdiction,
not vice-versa. Tribal jurisdiction is the preexisting given from which
other sovereigns' jurisdiction is subtracted; it derives from the Tribes'
inherent sovereignty and not from delegated federal power. 68 It is not
granted, but only removed, by federal law, 69 and it remains the baseline,
persisting residually and interstitially beneath and around the various
federal and state encroachments. The Tribes "still possess those aspects
of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute,"70 including some
measure of criminal jurisdiction. However, they have lost those sover-
eign powers inconsistent with their status as colonized, conquered, and
now "dependent" 71 nations. Nonetheless, they remain, in a meaningful
but complicated way, "a separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations." 72 Felix Cohen put it well: First, the
Tribes possess, "in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign
state;" second, by virtue of their "conquest," the Tribes "are subject to
the legislative power of the United States" and therefore have lost their
external powers of sovereignty, but not those relating to internal sover-
eignty and self-government; and finally, the remaining internal "powers
are subject to qualification by treaties" and Congressional legislation. 73
Thus, the starting point for all Federal Indian Law questions is,
which sovereign powers do the Indian tribes retain, and in which
States not covered by Public Law 280, the State has no jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-In-
dians against Indians; however, States do have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed between
non-Indians in Indian Country. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882) (holding
that the State had jurisdiction over murder committed by two non-Indians on reservation); Draper v.
United States, 164 U.S. 240,246 (1896) (following McBraney). Thus, in States not covered by Public
Law 280, state jurisdiction within Indian Country is limited to crimes that do not concern Indians or
Indian interests. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535 (1975). See also CoHEtN, supra note 57, at 363-72;
Clinton, supra note 57, at 564-68.
68. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326-30 (1978) (finding that because tribal autho-
rity does not trace to a federal source, double jeopardy does not bar concurrent federal and tribal pro-
secutions); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (noting that Indian
Tribes' "claim[s] to sovereignty long predate[] that of our own Government"). Tribal jurisdiction re-
mains "an important vestige of tribal sovereignty ...." Clinton, supra note 57, at 553.
69. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 326-27 (noting that "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute" and that the tribes' power to punish offenses against
the tribal law "is an aspect of its retained sovereignty ... further supported by the absence of any
federal grant of such power"); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (noting that "the
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those
not granted"). But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that
Indian courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians in absence of
federal grant of power).
70. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
71. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (stating that Tribes are "do-
mestic dependent nations" related to the United States as a "ward to his guardian"); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (noting that Indian Tribes' rights were not "entirely
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired .... ITiheir rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished").
72. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,381-82 (1886).
73. CoHEN, supra note 57, at 241-42.
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circumstances, to the exclusion of federal and state power? Again,
absent specific federal law to the contrary, absent some federal juris-
dictional "hook," tribal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
Country is complete, inherent, and exclusive.74 At the same time, the
Constitution gives Congress full power over Indian affairs, 75 and Con-
gress has repeatedly exercised this power to extend federal criminal
jurisdiction to Indian Country. We might say that criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country is there for the taking, if the United States wants it.
For this Article's purposes, there are three principle "hooks." First,
most "generally applicable" federal criminal laws (laws which, on their
face, apply to everyone, everywhere) apply in Indian Country.76 Second,
some statutes specifically proscribe certain conduct in Indian Country;
the occurrence of the conduct in Indian country is a material element of
these crimes.77 Finally, and most importantly, there are three statutory
provisions which create and structure most federal criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country: the Indian General Crimes Act (IGCA),78 also called
the Federal Enclaves Act; the Major Crimes Act; 79 and 18 U.S.C. § 3242,
which applies federal criminal procedure to all prosecutions under the
Major Crimes Act.8 0 I will discuss the various possible jurisdictional
"hooks" in turn.
B. THE INDIAN GENERAL CRIMES ACT
Under the IGCA, "the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States ... [extend] to the Indian coun-
try. "81 That is, Indian Country is, like a federal building, park, prison,
74. Unless, again, the exercise of jurisdiction would be "inconsistent" with the Tribes' dependent
status. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
75. U.S. CONSTr. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes .... ); US.CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1-2 ("The President... shall have
power... to make Treaties ....").
76. I argue below that this sweeping rule is inconsistent with principles of Federal Indian Law
and with the Constitution. However, it remains, for the most part, the accepted rule.
77. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156, 1161, 3055,3113,3488 (1994) (liquor violations); 18 U.S.C. §
1163 (1994) (theft or embezzlement from a tribe); 18 U.S.C. § 1164 (1994) (destruction of boundary
or warning signs on reservations).
78. § 1152.
79. § 1153.
80. § 3242 provides:
All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of and punishable under
section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within Indian country) of this title shall be
tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such
offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 214 (1973) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3242 requires
lesser-included offense instruction in prosecutions of crimes listed in Major Crimes Act). See gen-
erally Clinton, supra note 57, at 541-45 (discussing § 3242 and Keeble).
81. 18 U.S.C.§ 1152.
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military base, etc., a "federal enclave" for jurisdictional pur-poses. The
IGCA imports into Indian country the entire body of crim-inal law for
federal enclaves. These laws are a combination of borrowed state
statutes8 2 and provisions specifically designed for the federal enclaves.
Federal enclave laws adopt or define traditional state law crimes such as
arson,8 3 murder,8 4 and robbery,8 5 and then apply them to federal en-
claves by making the situs of the crime one of its elements. So, one can
violate an enclave law only by committing a certain act in an enclave.
The IGCA has three important exceptions: it does not apply to
intra-Indian crimes,86 or when an Indian has already been punished by
local tribal law, or when the Tribe retains exclusive jurisdiction by treaty.
For purposes of this Article, this first exception for intra-Indian crimes is
the most important feature of the IGCA. This exception reflects Con-
gress's recognition that such crimes are, whenever. possible, the self-gov-
erning Tribes' concerns-matters for them to deal with as they see fit.87
In such cases, the community should be permitted to speak its morality
to itself and to others, to look after the character development of its own.
But what if an intra-Indian crime is not covered by an enclave law, but
instead implicates a generally applicable federal law? For example, what
if one Indian assaults another Indian who happens to be a federal
officer?8 8 Such an assault is a federal crime, but does the IGCA's
82. The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, fills gaps in the coverage of the federal
criminal law by borrowing state criminal law and applying it to federal enclaves. The ACA is one of
the general laws of the United States which the IGCA extends to Indian Country and is also, therefore,
subject to the IGCA's three exceptions, described below. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711,
713 (1946) (holding that ACA applies to Indian Country). Scholars have questioned the appropriate-
ness of applying the ACA to Indian Country. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 290-91 (noting that the
"gaps" in the federal code's coverage, which the ACA was supposed to fill, are not an issue in Indian
Country given tribal laws and customs); Richard Monette, Comment, Indian Country Jurisdiction and
the Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 269, 271 (1990) (contending that ACA should not be
applicable in Indian Country).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1994).
84. § 1111.
85. § 2111. For a more complete list of criminal statutes applicable in federal enclaves, see
United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786,797 (2d Cir. 1992) cert. denied sub nom., Beglen v. United
States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
86. One purpose of the IGCA was to protect Indians from hostile neighbors, which explains the
Act's racial classifications. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201-06 (1978)
(discussing problem of jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country). Although the IGCA was
probably intended to apply to all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian Country, the Supreme
Court held, in United States v. McBratney, that state courts have jurisdiction over crimes by
non-Indians against other non-Indians. 104 U.S. 621,624 (1882).
87. The IGCA also does not apply to "victimless"crimes committed by Indians. See United States
v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916) (holding that federal government lacked jurisdiction over adultery
where both participants were Indian); see also CoHEN, supra note 57, at 299-300 (discussing same);
Clinton, supra note 57, at 529-30 (discussing same).
88. See United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977) (involving an assault by an Indian on
an Indian federal officer), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561
(8th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975); Walks on Top v. United States, 372 F.2d 422
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exception still apply? As we will see, the same question arises with the
federal conspiracy statute.
C. THE MAJOR CRIMES ACT
By excluding intra-Indian crimes from federal jurisdiction, the
IGCA left intact much of the Tribes' subsistent, inherent criminal
jurisdiction. But, in 1885, Congress again carved out a sizable portion of
the Tribes' baseline jurisdiction with the Major Crimes Act.89 The Act
was passed in response to the Supreme Court's unpopular decision in Ex
Parte Crow Dog ,90 which held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over a notorious and politically controversial intra-Indian murder in
Indian Country. 91 Congress reacted by extending federal jurisdiction to
certain enumerated serious crimes, even if committed in Indian Country,
regardless of the race of the victim. The Act's list of crimes was and is
exclusive; federal jurisdiction only extends to the enumerated offenses. 92
The Act thus reflects Congress's decision to respect, by leaving untouch-
ed, preexisting tribal jurisdiction over all unenumerated offenses.93 As
the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Quiver,94 "the
enumeration . . . of certain offenses ... carries with it some implication
of a purpose to exclude others." 95 This language arguably reveals
Congress's plan that the Major Crimes Act be the exclusive vehicle for
(9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 879 (1967).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
90. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
91. Ex Parte Crow Dog. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883). See generally Clinton, supra note 40, at
981-85 (discussing Ex Parte Crow Dog). But see Sidney Harting, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the
Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191 (1989) (discussing Ex Parte Crow
Dog). Harting insists that the Major Crimes Act was not merely a response to Ex Parte Crow Dog, but
rather the culmination of years of federal efforts to expand federal jurisdiction over Indians and
hasten their assimilation. Id. at 223-34. In United States v. Kagama, the Court upheld the Act and
located Congress's power to extend federal jurisdiction in the guardianship relation between Congress
and the Tribes, not in any provision of the Constitution. 118 U.S. 375,383-85 (1886).
92. The list of major crimes has grown from seven to fourteen since 1885. 18 U.S.C. § 1153
provides:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country,
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
But see Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (holding that Major Crimes Act jurisdiction
includes power to convict and sentence Indians for lesser included offenses, under 18 U.S.C. § 3242).
93. See Clinton, supra note 57, at 540 n.173 (noting that an earlier House amendment was
rejected by the Senate "because it would have extended total federal jurisdiction to Indian crimes").
94. 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
95. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916). See also United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977) ("Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all crimes
committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within Indian country are subject to the
jurisdiction of tribal courts.").
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prosecuting serious crimes by Indians in Indian country, precluding
prosecutions under both the IGCA and generally applicable federal
criminal statutes. 96 Defendants in recent leading cases have made this
argument, 97 but most courts have rejected it. Still, the Major Crimes Act,
especially when read with the IGCA and its exceptions, should preclude
federal prosecutions for unenumerated intra-Indian crimes. 98 But first, a
brief discussion of federal jurisdiction over violations of generally
applicable criminal laws is required.
D. "GENERALLY APPLICABLE" FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
Federal criminal statutes which, on their face, apply to everyone,
everywhere, also apply in Indian Country. Unfortunately, courts and
scholars often assert and accept this "rule" without question or qualifica-
tion. 99 For example, one scholar concluded that "[s]uch crimes actually
have little to do with Indian law, and it need only be noted that federal
jurisdiction over them applies in Indian country as it does everywhere
else."100 But this assumption should not be made too hastily; it should
be qualified. Keep in mind, for example, as Professor Cohen noted, that
Indians are subject to general federal laws "[w]here retained tribal
sovereignty . . . is not invaded and no other particular Indian right is
infringed." 101 And although Congress undoubtedly has the "plen-
ary"102 power to include Indians and tribes within the scope of general
96. See CoHEN, supra note 57, at 302.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.,
Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786,797 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied sub noma., Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
98. In Begay, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Major Crimes Act only addresses the application of
federal enclave law, and has no bearing on generally applicable laws. 42 F.3d at 498. However, as
Professor Cohen noted when discussing IGCA, such a reading is inconsistent with Congress's manifest
intent "to leave internal tribal matters to the Indians." CoHEN, supra note 57, at 297 (citing Quiver, 241
U.S. 602 and Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556).
99. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330 n.30 (1978) (noting that federal jurisdiction
extends to crimes over which there is federal jurisdiction regardless of whether an Indian is involved,
such as assaulting a federal officer); Begay, 42 F.3d at 499 (holding that conspiracy is a generally
applicable federal law); United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
federal jurisdiction exists under statutes of "general, non-territorial applicability"); St. Cloud v. United
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 n.7 (D.S.D. 1988) (noting that federal courts have jurisdiction over an
Indian who commits federal crimes such as mail fraud); United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453,458 (7th
Cir. 1977) (finding IGCA does not limit federal jurisdiction over violations of generally applicable
laws), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483,484 (1976) (finding
that Bald Eagle Protection Act is generally applicable federal law); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d
114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that court had jurisdiction over prosecution for unlawful possession of
a firearm by a felon); Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding IGCA's
intra-Indian exception does not apply to generally applicable federal laws), cert. denied, 420 U.S 978
(1975); Walks on Top v. United States, 372 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir.) (affirming jurisdiction over
intra-Indian shooting of BIA official), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 879 (1967).
100. CAny, supra note 60, at 119-20.
101. CoHEN, supra note 57, at 283.
102. As Professor Cohen observed, "[p]lenary does not mean 'absolute,' ... Congress is subject
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federal statutes (the power is "there for the taking"), Indian sovereignty
still means something, and therefore, under established principles of
Federal Indian Law, Congress must make it clear it knows what it is
doing, and intends to do it, when it limits or intrudes upon that sovereign-
ty.103
I will show why we should not blithely assume that general federal
criminal laws apply as a matter of course to intra-Indian crimes. When
the application of a general federal law infringes on Indian rights to
self-government, certain "canons of construction" require courts to
carefully examine whether Congress intended this result.104 Absent a
clear indication of such intent, and given tribal sovereignty, should all
general federal criminal laws always apply in Indian Country, just like
anyplace else, or only particular laws, in particular situations, when
federal intervention is non-controversially appropriate?105 Who should
have the "burden of persuasion" when it comes to criminal jurisdiction,
the United States or the Tribes? As the IGCA and the Major Crimes Act
make clear, Congress is well aware of its plenary power to extend crimi-
nal jurisdiction over the Indians and Indian tribes. Should we assume
that, despite these explicit exercises of power, and despite the general
principle that congressional abrogations of tribal sovereignty must be
to constitutional strictures in its dealings with Indians." Id. at 217. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 555 (1974), for example, the Court stated that legislation dealing with Indians must also be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians." Congress's "trust"
responsibility toward the Indians, like the explicit limits in the Constitution, constrains federal power to
regulate Indians and Tribes. See generally CoHEN, supra note 57, at 217-28 (discussing limitations on
federal power). For a thorough analysis and critique of the "plenary power doctrine," see generally
Newton, supra note 41.
103. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("[U]ntil Congress acts, the tribes
retain their existing sovereign powers."); COHEN, supra note 57, at 286 (noting that Supreme Court has
required clear "congressional purpose" of applicability to Indians). See also Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.15 (1996) (noting that "principles of federalism, require us always to
apply the clear statement rule before we consider the constitutional question whether Congress has the
power to abrogate [States' sovereign immunity]"); id. at 1185 (stating similarly that "a plain statement
is required when Congress pre-empts" States' powers) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (noting
that Congress may not limit state power via federal statute without a plain statement of its intent).
104. CotEN, supra note 57, at 223-25, 283. See also United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 455
(8th Cir. 1974) (noting that "areas traditionally left to tribal self-government ... have enjoyed an
exception from the general rule that congressional enactments, in terms applying to all persons,
includes Indians and their property interests" (footnotes omitted)). But see United States v. Blue, 722
F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Congress must have assumed that Indians on reservations would
generally be subject, as all other citizens are, to federal criminal sanctions which apply to all
persons.").
105. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 330 (noting that federal jurisdiction extends to crimes where
there is an independent federal interest to be protected); United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786,
799 (2d Cir. 1992) (federal jurisdiction does not exist over unenumerated intra-Indian crimes except
where such crimes are "peculiarly Federal"), cert. denied sub nom., Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S.
1086 (1993).
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explicit, Congress has nonetheless implicitly applied all general federal
criminal laws to Indian Country?106
In summary, the historical and conceptual baseline-the given-in
Indian Country is the Tribes' exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The Tribes
have lost some of this inherent jurisdiction through conquest and treaty.
Congress may also, as it has done, carve out additional shares of this
jurisdiction. It has done so through the IGCA, the Major Crimes Act, by
explicitly criminalizing conduct in Indian Country and, more controver-
sially, by enacting an ever-expanding litany of generally applicable
criminal statutes. The next Part examines whether any of the various
available jurisdictional "hooks" provide an adequate basis for jurisdic-
tion over intra-Indian conspiracies in Indian Country.
IV. A HOLE IN THE QUILT: CONSPIRACY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The conspiracy statute may be a federal prosecutor's most potent
weapon. By punishing agreements, as well as conduct, it dramatically
increases the potential for governmental control over persons' and
associations' lives. Given our well-pedigreed liking for limited govern-
ment, we should be wary of such unchecked breadth in a criminal statute,
and of any uncertainty about the statute's reach. This is even more true
for Native Americans, whose communities' ability to govern themselves
faces erosion and attrition. In Federal Indian Law, where sovereigns
compete for and jealously guard criminal jurisdiction, the power to
punish conspiracies is a valuable card to hold. Unfortunately, as this Part
will show, the clarity of conspiracy jurisdiction-indeed of jurisdiction
over all generally applicable federal crimes-in Indian Country is a
casualty of the jurisdictional maze.
A. ON JURISDICTIONAL "HOOKS"
Congress's ability to extend its criminal jurisdiction is limited both
by its enumerated powers and by the States' reserved powers. Congress
can expand its jurisdiction when it wishes, but it needs a "hook" upon
which to hang its ambitions. Early on, Congress turned to its postal
power1 07 to enact the Mail Fraud statute.108 The Constitution gives
Congress power to regulate bankruptcies and naturalization; 109 hence,
106. Remember that Congress specifically rejected a plan to expand federal jurisdiction to all
crimes in Indian Country just before it passed the Major Crimes Act. Clinton, supra note 57, at 540
n.173.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 7 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish Post
Offices and post Roads .... ).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... To establish an uni-
form Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
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bankruptcy fraud110 and immigration-related crimes. Congress may
levy income and other taxes; 111 hence, the federal crime of tax eva-
sion. 112 Other "hooks" are much more broad. For example, dozens of
federal criminal statutes outlaw conduct which affects, or takes place in,
interstate commerce.' 13 Also, the Constitution gives Congress the
sweeping powers to spend, to "provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare"114 and "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper"1 l5 for carrying out its specifically enumerated powers.
These grants have provided the jurisdictional bases in recent years for
new, exceptionally broad, federal criminal statutes prohibiting theft or
bribery from programs and government entities receiving federal
funds.116 Today, of course, such programs are everywhere.
The point here is simply that Congress has plenty of constitutional
tools available when it wants to expand its criminal jurisdiction. In a
sense, Lopez was merely a reminder that the tool box is finite. But, is the
same box, are the same tools, always available when Congress's federaliz-
ing activity affects criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country? This Part
examines the possible jurisdictional bases, not for the conspiracy statute
itself, but for its application in Indian Country. This detailed, fairly
technical, examination sets up the problem of justifying the indiscrimi-
nate use of generally applicable federal criminal laws in Indian Country.
B. CONSPIRACY AND THE INDIAN GENERAL CRIMEs ACT
Under the IGCA, "the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . extend to the Indian
Country." 1 7 One of the material elements of an enclave law offense is
that the alleged offense occurred in a federal enclave; that is, "the situs
of the offense is an element of the crime." 118 Clearly, the federal
States....").
110. 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
111. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises .. ); U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes ... .
112. See, eg., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994).
113. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994) (RICO) ("racketeering activity" must affect commerce);
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (The Hobbs Act) (punishing robbery, extortion, and other crimes that
"affect[] commerce").
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See generally David Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE
LJ. 1 (1994).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Intrpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE LJ.
267 (1993).
116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). See generally David N. Rosenstein, Section 666: The
Beast in the Federal Criminal Arsenal, 39 CAm. U. L. REv. 673 (1990).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
118. United States v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
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conspiracy statute is not an enclave law, and so it follows that the IGCA
and its exceptions do not apply.
Is it that simple? Maybe not. The federal conspiracy statute is not
an enclave law, but the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) is. The ACA
incorporates the criminal laws of the state in which a given enclave is
situated into that enclave. So, perhaps the conspiracy laws of a given
state apply in Indian country, via the joint effect of the ACA and the
IGCA, subject, of course, to the IGCA's exceptions. 119 In Williams v.
United States,120 the Supreme Court suggested that they did not. The
Court refused, in an enclave prosecution, to use the ACA to borrow a
state's statutory-rape statute, which applied when the victim was under 18
years of age, since there was a federal provision which only applied to
victims under the age of 16.121 State definitions of a crime, the Court
held, cannot replace an applicable federal definition.122 This rule makes
good sense, given the Act's purpose-to fill "gaps" in the federal
code. 123 When there is no gap, the Act should not be used.
Another wrinkle: Could the ACA be used to incorporate a state-de-
fined conspiracy in a case where a defendant in Indian Country alleged-
ly conspired to commit a state law crime, a crime not "against the
United States" and not involving "defraud[ing] the United States?" 124
In such a case, because the federal statute would not apply, isn't there a
"gap" in federal coverage? If all parties involved are Indian, of course,
the IGCA's exception for intra-Indian crimes should apply. This
exception does not apply to the conspiracy statute itself, because it is not
an enclave law, but it would apply if the ACA (an enclave law) were the
vehicle for incorporating the conspiracy charge. If the parties are not all
Native Americans, the question comes down to whether the existence of
the federal conspiracy statute preempts all use of the States' conspiracy
statutes in Indian Country, regardless of whether the conspiracy's
substantive object violates a federal or state law. In United States v.
Butler,125 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
only federal enclave laws (and the federal conspiracy statute is not such a
law) preempt the incorporation of state laws via the ACA.126 The court
119. See Clinton, supra note 57, at 534 ("Assimilative Crimes Act jurisdiction on Indian lands is a
type of double derivative jurisdiction.").
120. 327 U.S. 711 (1946).
121. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711,724-25 (1946).
122. Id. at 717-19; see also United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730,737 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that
resort to state law was not permissible when an act was already punishable under federal law).
123. See Williams, 327 U.S. at 718 ("The Assimilative Crimes Act has a natural place to fill
through its supplementation of the Federal Criminal Code .....
124. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
125. 541 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1976).
126. Butler, 541 F.2d at 733.
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held that state law may not be assimilated when "any enactment of
Congress" punishes the conduct.127 The court noted that the Supreme
Court in Williams was concerned "not with whether the precise acts had
been made penal, but with the discernment of the intent of Congress to
punish the generic conduct in question."128 Thus, Butler and Williams
suggest that the federal conspiracy statute's existence precludes the
assimilation, via the ACA, of any state conspiracy statute into Indian
Country, regardless of the conspiracy's aim or purpose.
Therefore, the IGCA does not provide a jurisdictional hook for
conspiracy. The federal conspiracy statute is not an enclave law, and the
ACA cannot be used to import a state's definition of conspiracy into
federal law. Still, we should take from our analysis of the IGCA its
strong commitment to tribal sovereignty, evident in the exceptions for
intra-Indian offenses and for crimes already punished under tribal
law.129
C. CONSPIRACY UNDER THE MAJOR CRIMES ACT
Here, too, at first glance, the answer is easy. Conspiracy is not an
enumerated offense under the Major Crimes Act, 130 nor a lesser-included
offense of any enumerated crime. 131 The Act has always been strictly
construed. The Supreme Court in Quiver stated that Congress intended
"to permit the personal and domestic relations of the Indians with each
other to be regulated, and offenses by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian to be dealt with, according to their tribal
customs and laws."132 This statement echoes the Wheeler principle that,
127. Id.
128. Id. at 735 (footnote omitted).
129. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 290 ("These two provisos together ... manifest[] a broad
respect for tribal sovereignty, particularly in matters affecting only Indians.").
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 453 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,469 U.S. 864 (1984).
131. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1994), persons tried under the Major Crimes Act are to be tried "in
the same courts and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such offense within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." Ever since Keeble v. United States, this statute has been
interpreted (through the "in the same manner" language) to extend Major Crimes Act jurisdiction to
lesser included offenses. See 412 U.S. 205 (1973). However, this interpretation creates incentives for
federal prosecutors to initiate sham prosecutions for enumerated offenses, and then accept guilty pleas
to lesser included offenses. But see CANBY, supra note 60, at 131-32 (citing Keeble for the proposition
that "the right to request an instruction on a lesser included offense can probably be restricted to the
defense").
132. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 604 (1916); see also United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977) (noting that intra-Indian offenses may only be tried in federal courts if
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1244 (9th Cir. 1980)
(noting that "Congress' intent was to leave all but the major crimes [listed in the Major Crimes Act] to
the tribes to be dealt with according to their own laws and customs"); Clinton, supra note 57, at 540
n.173 (noting Congress's deliberate effort to preserve tribal jurisdiction over offenses not enumerated
in the Major Crimes Act).
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although tribal sovereignty is limited and subject to Congress's plenary
power, this sovereignty persists until it is in fact taken away.133
Courts have refused to uphold federal jurisdiction under the Major
Crimes Act over non-enumerated crimes (like conspiracy). In United
States v. Narcia ,134 for example, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
over an intra-Indian attempted robbery in Indian Country because that
crime was not listed in the Major Crimes Act.135 The court noted that:
there is no authority expressly allowing federal prosecutors to
charge Indian defendants with crimes not enumerated in the
Major Crimes Act.
If the government may properly charge defendants with
attempt, the government arguably may charge them with aiding
and abetting, conspiracy or various other crimes as well. All of
these crimes are beyond the scope of the Major Crimes Act
and, as such, may not be charged by the government.136
Courts have also, however, rejected the argument, implicit in Narcia,
that the Major Crimes Act is the exclusive vehicle for prosecuting
intra-Indian crime. Instead, these courts have limited the Major Crimes
Act's force to federal enclave laws, and read it as having no effect on the
force of generally applicable federal laws.137 That is, on this view, the
Act merely cancels the IGCA's intra-Indian exception for the Act's
enumerated crimes. But this reading, like the now-common statement
133. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 325 n.22 (1978); see also Quiver, 241 U.S. at
605-06 (Tribes' jurisdiction over their own relations persists "save when Congress expressly or clearly
directs otherwise").
134. 776 F. Supp. 491 (D. Ariz. 1991).
135. United States v. Narcia, 776 F. Supp. 491,494 (D. Ariz. 1991).
136. Id.; see also Quiver, 241 US. at 606 (holding jurisdiction over adultery charge did not lie in
federal courts); United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 465 (4th Cir. 1987) (Indian defendant could not
be charged with first degree rape as defined by North Carolina state law); United States v. Torres, 733
F.2d 449,453 n.2 (7th Cir.) (noting that conspiracy is not listed in the Major Crimes Act, and therefore
charge of conspiracy to commit murder had to be brought under Section 1152), cert denied, 469 U.S.
864 (1984); United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1285-88 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that federal
statute proscribing hunting on Indian reservation did not apply to Indian defendant since it was not
enumerated in Major Crimes Act and not intended by Congress to apply to Indians); United States v.
Tyndall, 400 F. Supp. 949, 952 (D. Neb. 1975) (noting that court lacked jurisdiction over charge of
assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury). But see United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 500 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding conspiracy jurisdiction but distinguishing Narcia on ground that there was no
generally applicable attempt statute), cert. denied sub nom., Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93
(1995).
137. See Begay, 42 F.3d at 498 (noting that "the Major Crimes Act deals only with the application
of federal enclave law to Indians and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide applicability").
Accord United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d
383,386 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453,457-58 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483,484 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bums,
529 F.2d 114, 116-17 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Markiewicz, No. 89-CR-88, 1989 WL 139221,
at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1989), affid in part, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
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that the IGCA's intra-Indian exception does not limit the applicability of
general federal laws, is inconsistent with a major purpose of both laws,
namely, to limit intrusions on tribal sovereignty. If the Major Crimes
Act's list merely abrogates the IGCA's intra-Indian exception, and the
exception, in turn, only applies to the small group of enclave laws, then
the two Acts do not serve this purpose very well at all.
It is clear the Major Crimes Act does not specifically confer federal
jurisdiction over conspiracies. But could the federal courts exercise
derivative conspiracy jurisdiction, based on an unquestionably enumerat-
ed substantive offense? Over a conspiracy to commit arson, for exam-
ple? Even if the Major Crimes Act does not list conspiracy, the argu-
ment goes, the enumeration of a crime like arson implies derivative
jurisdiction over conspiracies to commit arson. 138 The Second Circuit
seemed to approve such a move in United States v. Markiewicz.139 The
court affirmed the district court's finding of jurisdiction over, inter alia,
conspiracy to steal tribal funds, 140 conspiracy to violate the federal
anti-riot act, 14 1 and conspiracy to commit arson, 142 as well as over the
substantive crimes which were the objects of the conspiracies.' 43 The
Second Circuit only asked whether there was federal jurisdiction over the
substantive offense, not over the conspiracy charges.14 4 For example,
the court noted that arson is an enumerated crime under the Major
Crimes Act; found that the defendants were properly charged under one
of two permissible federal arson statutes; and therefore affirmed jurisdic-
tion, without addressing whether the court had jurisdiction over the
conspiracy charge itself. 145  The court, arguably, could have affirmed
jurisdiction over the conspiracy charges on the theory that the conspira-
cy statute is a generally applicable criminal law, 14 6 but it did not.
The Markiewicz court's treatment of the conspiracy question may
have been an aberration. Aberration or not, it emphatically should be
138. Note that a similar argument could be made about an attempt to commit an enumerated
crime. See Narcia, 776 F. Supp. at 491.
139. 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086
(1993).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1994).
141. See § 2101.
142. See § 844).
143. United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 800-02 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub noma.,
Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 801.
146. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 371
"is a federal criminal statute of nationwide applicability"), cert. denied sub noma., Benally v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995); State v. Robles, 901 P.2d 1200, 1202, 1204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (although
conspiracy to commit murder not an enumerated Major Crime, murder is, and the conspiracy statute is
generally applicable, so federal court had jurisdiction).
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rejected. It is black-letter law that conspiracy is a crime all its own; "the
commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are
separate and distinct offenses." 147 It would defeat Congress's implied
plan to omit conspiracy from the Major Crimes Act-remember Quiv-
er's recognition that the enumeration of some crimes implies an intent to
exclude others 148-if conspiracy jurisdiction were to sneak into the
federal arsenal via attachment to an enumerated substantive offense.149
Such a move would certainly confirm Justice Jackson's fears about
conspiracy's incorrigible tendency to expand itself.150 In other contexts,
courts have recognized that when Congress neglects to include a conspir-
acy offense in a substantive criminal statute, the omission should be
presumed intentional.151 We should indulge the same presumption when
construing the Major Crimes Act.
Perhaps there is an exception to the "rule" that the enumeration of
certain crimes in the Major Crimes Act excludes jurisdiction over un-
enumerated crimes? When Congress amended the Major Crimes Act in
1976, it noted, in the legislative history to that amendment, an "over-
riding exception" for crimes that are "peculiarly Federal. Thus, there is
Federal jurisdiction when the offense is one such as assaulting a Federal
officer .. .or defrauding the United States."152 Under this "overriding
exception" then, the Major Crimes Act's enumeration of certain crime
would not be read to exclude jurisdiction over unenumerated crimes
which are "peculiarly federal". Consider United States v. Jackson,153 in
which an Indian defendant was charged with hunting without his Tribe's
permission on his Tribe's reservation. 154 Although the language of the
147. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946); see also United States v. Felix, 503
U.S. 378, 389-91 (1992) (adhering to "distinction between conspiracy to commit an offense and the
offense itself"); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985) ("[Conspiracy is a distinct offense
from the completed object of the conspiracy."); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947)
("[Tlhe agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.").
148. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602,606 (1916).
149. See, e.g., Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
because the Major Crimes Act authorized federal jurisdiction over a second-degree murder charge, it
also authorized, by extension, jurisdiction over charge of use of a firearm in the commission of a
crime of violence), cert. denied. 116 S. Ct. 1444 (1996).
150. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing
CARDozo, supra note 30, at 51); see also supra text accompanying note 30.
151. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 400-01 (1980) (noting that the penalties applic-
able to substantive drug offense could not be imposed as sentence for conspiracy drug offenses);
United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367, 1368-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that the Sentencing Commission
lacked authority to create career offender guidelines for conspiracy offenses because conspiracy was
not listed in the statute directing creation of guidelines for certain substantive offenses); United States
v. Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that mandatory minimum sentences
applicable to substantive drug offenses are not applicable to conspiracy offenses).
152. HR. REP. No. 1038, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) (only those federal statutes of general ap-
plicability with a peculiarly Federal interest apply to intra-Indian offense in Indian country).
153. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
154. United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
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relevant statute suggested that it applied to Native Americans and non-In-
dians alike,15 5 the court held that it did not apply to Indians, because
there was no need for federal prosecution, or for an "overriding excep-
tion, because the tribe could exercise jurisdiction if it so chose."156 The
court emphasized that "except for the offenses enumerated in [the
Major Crimes Act], all crimes committed by enrolled Indians against
other Indians within Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction of
tribal courts." 157 On the other hand, in United States v. Farris,158 the
court found that the federal government did have jurisdiction over
Indian defendants' violation of the illegal gambling statute,15 9 because
of the independent and important federal interest in protecting com-
merce and fighting organized crime. 160 Federal jurisdiction did not
derive simply from the law's general applicability, but rather from the
particularly federal interest -curbing organized crime -triggering the
"overriding exception." That is, the court did not simply assert that
jurisdiction followed from the existence of a generally applicable law;
instead, given the Quiver principle that the enumeration of some crimes
implies an intent to exclude others, the court looked for a "peculiarly
federal" interest to justify this particular prosecution for an unenumer-
ated offense.
Indeed, in most cases when Indians have been prosecuted for
non-Major Crimes Act crimes committed in Indian Country, there has
been a plausible, peculiarly federal, interest in prosecution. This does
not mean, though, that the courts have explicitly stated that they are
applying the overriding exception to the Quiver principle. In United
States v. Dodge,161 for example, Indian defendants were charged with
conspiracy to obstruct, impede, and interfere with law enforcement offi-
cials during a political demonstration. 162 Because the law enforcement
agents who were assaulted were all federal agents, the court held that they
"were engaged in a federally-protected function" and so there was
federal jurisdiction over the crimes. 163 Another brand of non-Major
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1994) ("Whoever... willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that be-
longs to any .. . Indian tribe ... for the purpose of hunting... shall be fined... or imprisoned ... .
156. Jackson, 600 F.2d at 1286-88.
157. Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,643 n.2 (1977)).
158. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
160. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1111
(1981).
161. 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
162. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099
(1977).
163. Id. at 780. Compare Dodge with United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied sub nom., Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995), in which the law enforcement agents
were not federal agents, but members of the Tribal police. See also United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d
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Crimes Act offenses that often appear in the federal courts are violations
of endangered species legislation. For example, the Bald Eagle Protec-
tion Act164 was clearly intended to abrogate Indian hunting rights.165
The Act clearly reflects, or claims to reflect, a peculiarly federal inter-
estl 66 and the courts apparently believe that no Indian rights "essential
to tribal self-government"167 are infringed by the Act.
Conspiracy is not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, and so the
Act does not confer conspiracy jurisdiction in Indian Country. There is
some question whether a conspiracy charge can piggy-back its way into
federal court when the substantive object of the conspiracy is an enumer-
ated Major Crime. This piggy-backing is unwarranted and unauthor-
ized. Even when a crime is not enumerated, many courts have claimed
jurisdiction on the ground that the Major Crimes Act only applies to
enclave laws and it does not at all limit federal jurisdiction over violations
of generally applicable federal laws, even when the violations take place
in Indian Country. But if this approach is right, the Major Crimes Act
does not amount to much at all, and Congress has pulled off, sub silentio,
a major power-grab. This approach allows Congress to avoid the Major
Crimes Act's limits and its role in preserving the Tribes' sovereignty
merely by passing many generally applicable laws.
D. GENERALLY APPLICABLE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
If the conspiracy statute is not an enclave law, applicable to Indian
Country via the IGCA or an enumerated offense under the Major Crimes
Act, what potential jurisdictional hooks remain? Although it is tempting
to conclude that, at least in intra-Indian cases, conspiracy jurisdiction is
wholly in the hands of the Tribes, a third vehicle for federal jurisdiction,
alluded to above, stands in the way: the theory that "general federal
criminal statutes . . . apply in Indian country to all persons, whether or
not Indian .... Such crimes actually have little to do with Indian law,
and it need only be noted that federal jurisdiction over them applies in
Indian country as it does everywhere else."16 8
453, 458 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (concluding that the district court had
"jurisdiction because of the 'peculiarly Federal' nature" of the crime); Stone v. United States, 506
F.2d 561,563 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. deniedi 420 U.S. 978 (1975) (finding the assault of BIA officer by
Indian in Indian country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and § 1114 under federal jurisdiction); Walks
on Top v. United States, 372 F.2d 422,425 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 879 (1967).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994).
165. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-45 (1986) (finding that Congress intended to
abrogate Indian rights with the Bald Eagle Protection Act and Endangered Species Act).
166. Id. at 740 (noting federal nature of crime of violating Eagle Protection Act).
167. Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting "basic principle
that the Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction over essential matters of reservation government"),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
168. CAmY, supra note 60, at 119-20.
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If the federal conspiracy statute is such a law,1 69 and if indeed
generally applicable criminal statutes apply in Indian Country, as they
do everywhere else, our inquiry could end here, with this straightforward,
mundane, but deeply misguided conclusion. The conclusion is misguid-
ed because it requires us to ignore the clear history and purpose of Con-
gress's extensions of federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian Country.
This intrusion was intended to be limited, to be respectful of tribal
sovereignty, especially-as the IGCA's exceptions make clear-in
intra-Indian matters. 170 So, the statement that general federal laws apply
in Indian Country "just like anywhere else," and these laws have "noth-
ing to do with Indian law," requires re-examination. The next Part re-
examines this statement by analyzing the Courts of Appeals' different
approaches.
V. A CONFLICT IN THE CIRCUITS?
The United States Courts of Appeals are split on the reach of
generally applicable federal criminal laws in Indian Country. Some
might say they are only "hair-split," because they differ at such a
narrow and technical point. But, as I suggested at the outset, this narrow
point is central both to the task of exploring the reach of the federal
conspiracy statute in Indian Country and to broader concerns about
tribal sovereignty. Importantly, many of the leading cases deal with
intra-tribal political disputes.
The circuit courts agree that the IGCA's exceptions for intra-Indian
crimes and crimes already prosecuted under tribal law apply only to
federal enclave laws, and they agree that the Major Crimes Act merely
abrogates the IGCA's intra-Indian exception for the enumerated
crimes.171 Unfortunately, although the agreed-upon proposition is not
supported by the history, purpose, and principles of Federal Indian Law,
it seems well-entrenched. In contrast, the courts remain divided over the
extent to which generally applicable federal criminal laws apply in
169. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that conspiracy is a
generally applicable federal criminal law), cert. denied sub nom., Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
93 (1995).
170. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205,209 (1973) (noting that the Major Crimes Act is
"a carefully limited intrusion of federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian
tribes..." (emphasis added)).
171. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1993) (discussing the Tenth Circuit's hold-
ing regarding criminal jurisdiction in Indian country); United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1003 (6th
Cir. 1994) (citing Negonsott and discussing criminal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995);
Begay, 42 F.3d at 498 (noting that "Major Crimes Act deals only with the application of federal
enclave laws"); United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 384 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that § 1152 and its
exceptions "do not extend or restrict ... general federal criminal statutes ... [and] appl[y] only to
federal enclave laws").
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Indian Country. How other courts deal with this problem will have
important implications for the future of tribal sovereignty and self-defini-
tion through criminal law. Is Indian Country really "just like anyplace
else," or are there limits on federal jurisdiction besides those in the
IGCA and the Major Crimes Act? Or, if the Major Crimes Act and the
IGCA cannot do much, on their own, to limit the reach of federal crimi-
nal law, do they suggest at least a presumption, a canon of construction,
or an informing principle that can?
A. THE NINTH, EIGHTH, AND SIXTH CIRCUITS' APPROACH
The leading case from the Ninth Circuit is United States v. Be-
gay. 172 Begay grew out of the heavily-publicized federal fraud investiga-
tion of former Navajo Chairman Peter MacDonald, MacDonald's ouster
from tribal power, and his subsequent violent attempt to regain author-
ity.173 The story is a very interesting one. In early 1989, the United
States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs was looking into
allegations of fraud and corruption in the Navajo Nation Tribal Govern-
ment, focusing in part on Chairman MacDonald.1 74 MacDonald, who
was well aware of this investigation, learned that the Navajo Tribal
Council was planning to put him on administrative leave pending the
Senate investigation's outcome. 175 The Council was concerned about
maintaining a credible tribal government, and they apparently thought
administrative leave would both serve this end and give MacDonald a
chance to clear his name, if possible. 176 Over MacDonald's objections,
the Council took the unprecedented step of placing him on paid admin-
istrative leave and stripping him of his legislative and executive authori-
ty.177
MacDonald and his supporters insisted, with some justification, that
the Council lacked authority for its action. 178 Rather than go along with
172. 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cit. 1994).
173. United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 490-97 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Benally
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995).
174. Id. at 490. See also Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Ex-Navajo Leader Guilty in Tribal Riot-9
Others Convicted in '89 Affair, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1992, at Al; Paul Davenport, Democracy
Called Navajo Riot's Aim-MacDonald Backers' Trial Nearing End, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1992, at
B6; Retracing Day of Violence on Reservation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 22, 1989, at A10; Mark N. Tra-
hant & Bill Donovan, Navajo Riot Leaves 1 Killed, 3 Injured-MacDonald Backers Storm Tribal Office,
ARmZ. REPUBLIC, July 21, 1989, at Al. The MacDonald investigations led to his conviction for several
crimes, including racketeering, extortion, and mail fraud. Begay, 42 F.3d at 490 n.1.
175. Begay,42 F.3d at 490.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The Navajo Tribal Code did not explicitly provide for such an action. Id. The council
had, however, previously placed the Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court on administrative
leave. Id. at 490 n.3.
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the Council's resolution, MacDonald put together his own competing
government, and he and his sympathizers tried to continue to govern the
Nation. 179 In the weeks that followed, MacDonald and his supporters
tried to win popular support for the insurgent government.180 MacDon-
ald's group provoked various procedural and political skirmishes with
the Tribal Council and courts. 181 The Nation's affairs-even its Su-
preme Court-were thrown into confusion; the two warring factions each
gave different instructions to bewildered tribal employees, who were no
longer sure who had the authority to give orders.182 The controversy
and tension grew; demonstrations and sit-ins were common, and these
incidents became increasingly confrontational and, on occasion, violent.
In late June 1989, and throughout July, MacDonald and his follow-
ers planned to oust their rival tribal government.' 8 3 On July 18, they
held a rally at which MacDonald urged those present to help him "take
back the government."184 Former Navajo Nation chairman, Raymond
Nakai, read a forged letter, supposedly from the United States Attorney,
which purported to clear MacDonald from any charges connected to the
Senate's fraud investigation. 8 5 Nakai also invited the Navajo people to
a protest rally on July 20.186 This rally, attended by hundreds, evolved
into a planning session for the MacDonald forces' takeover and occupa-
tion of the Nation's Administration Building. 187 At one point, MacDon-
ald supporters handed out clubs to use against the Tribal Police if
necessary, and they demonstrated how to use these weapons.188
In the early evening, between two and three hundred demonstrators,
many armed with clubs, arrived at the Administration and Finance
Building, and gathered outside its locked doors. 189 When tribal police
officer Lt. Daniel Hawkins approached the crowd, he was quickly
surrounded. 190 He tried to escape, but he was captured, maced, and beat-
en. 19 1 Several other officers were also attacked, and even shot; one
demonstrator was killed.19 2 The demonstrators broke into the Admin-
179. Id. at 491.
180. Begay, 42 F.3d at 491.
181. Id. at 491-97.
182. Id. at 491-92.
183. Id. at 492-97.
184. Id. at 493.
185. Begay, 42 F.3d at 493. Nakai questioned the authenticity of the letter, but was assured it
was legitimate. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 493-94.
188. Id. at 493.
189. Id. at 495.
190. Begay, 42 F.3d at 495.
191. Id. at 495-96.
192. Id. at 496-97.
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istration and Finance Building and ransacked it, stealing blank tribal
checks and other documents.193 Later that night, the police regained
control, and sealed off the building.194 In November 1992, after deliber-
ating 21 days, a federal petit jury convicted MacDonald and nine others
on 26 of 48 conspiracy and assault-related charges. 195
On appeal, MacDonald and his co-conspirators argued that the
United States District Court lacked jurisdiction over the charges of
conspiracy to commit assault and kidnapping; arguing, in effect, that
there was no federal jurisdictional hook for conspiracy.196 Their argu-
ment was based on the fact that the conspiracy charges arose out of
events between Indians, in Indian Country, and that conspiracy is not an
enumerated crime under the Major Crimes Act. 197 MacDonald also
argued that "conspiracy is not a law of universal, nationwide applicabili-
ty, which applies to all persons, Indian or non-Indian, in Indian country
or out of it."198
Now, these are related, but distinct, claims. If the Major Crimes Act
confers conspiracy jurisdiction on the federal courts, the government
need not prove that the law is one of "universal nationwide applicabili-
ty." This much is clear. But what if the juridictional hook for the law at
issue, here the conspiracy statute, is that it is generally applicable? Most
courts have assumed that such a statute applies in Indian Country, to
intra-Indian crimes, "just like anywhere else." But this assumption is
mistaken; what should be asked is whether the statute should be applied
to intra-Indian crimes in Indian Country, given its conspicuous absence
from the Major Crimes Act and the implicit purpose of both the Act and
the IGCA to respect tribal sovereignty in internal matters.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected MacDonald's claim "that
Indians may not be charged for any criminal conduct beyond those
crimes enumerated in [the Major Crimes Act]."199 The court insisted
that the Major Crimes Act only concerns "the application of federal
enclave law to Indians and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide
193. Id. at 497.
194. Id.
195. See Shaffer & Donovan, supra note 174, at Al.
196. United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486,497-98 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Benally
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995). The appellants were charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1153, and
1201(c). Id. at 497.
197. Id. at 497-98.
198. Id. at 498.
199. Id. Actually, MacDonald's claim was that, given the exceptions in the IGCA, federal juris-
diction over intra-Indian crimes in Indian country is limited to those offenses enumerated in the Major
Crimes Act. In fact, the court characterized his claim this way just one page earlier. Id. at 497. This
superficially minor error may have reflected a deeper misunderstanding of MacDonald's claims, and
of the first principles of Federal Indian Law.
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applicability that make actions criminal wherever committed." 200 And,
the court continued, the IGCA-with its exception for intra-Indian
crimes-covers only enclave laws, laws for which "the situs of the
offense is an element of the crime." 201 The court entertained "no
doubt" that the federal conspiracy statute is not a federal enclave law,
because the situs of the conspiracy is not an element of the offense, or
that the statute is, MacDonald's claim notwithstanding, one of nationwide
applicability which applies "equally to everyone everywhere .. ".."202
Because the conspiracy statute is generally applicable nationwide, and
because Indians are not explicitly excluded from its scope, the court
concluded that the district court had jurisdiction.203
Although the Begay case is somewhat notorious, it is only one of
several recent cases 204 in a line of similar Ninth Circuit decisions.205 In
United States v. Young,206 another example, an Indian defendant was
convicted of assaulting a federal officer, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. 207 The
Ninth Circuit held that, although "[a]s a general rule, tribal courts retain
exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Native Americans
against other Native Americans in Indian Country," the federal courts
retain jurisdiction over violations of "federal laws of general,
non-territorial applicability."208 The court quickly observed that Young
had been charged with such offenses, and therefore the Major Crimes
Act was not a bar to federal jurisdiction.2 09
The Eighth Circuit takes an approach much like the Ninth's. In
United States v. Blue,2 10 the defendant, an enrolled member of the Turtle
200. Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cit. 1976)).
201. Begay, 42 F.3d at 498 (quoting United States v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
202. Id. at 499. The court cited United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975), for the
proposition that federal criminal laws apply to Indians unless a treaty specifically exempts them.
Begay, 42 F.3d at 499. But this proposition turns the first principle of Federal Indian Law on its head!
Federal laws do not apply unless a treaty, or other valid exercise of federal power, explicitly extends
federal power to Indian Country.
203. Begay, 42 F.3d at 500.
204. For more recent treatment of these issues see, for example, United States v. Kitcheyan, 66
F.3d 336 (9th Cit. 1995) (mem.) (rejecting subject-matter jurisdiction challenge to conspiracy and em-
bezzlement charges, citing Begay) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 970 (1996) and State v. Robles, 901 P.2d
1200, 1202-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that federal courts have jurisdiction over conspiracy to
commit murder in Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 371, citing Begay).
205. Similar Ninth Circuit decisions include United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.
1980), United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), United
States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cit. 1976), United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1976),
and Walks on Top v. United States, 372 F.2d 422 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 879 (1967).
206. 936 F.2d 1050 (9th Cit. 1991).
207. United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming convictions under 18
U.S.C. §§ 111,922(g), 924(c)).
208. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980)).
209. Id.
210. 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cit. 1983).
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Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, was convicted for distribution of
marijuana and possession with intent to distribute hashish. 211 Because
these offenses are not listed in the Major Crimes Act, Blue argued that
the district court lacked jurisdiction.212 What's more, Blue claimed that
because the federal agent to whom Blue sold the drugs was an Indian,
and because all relevant events took place on the Turtle Mountain
Reservation, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction, given the IGCA's
exception for intra-Indian crimes.213
But the court in Blue, like the court in Begay, insisted that the IGCA
has no effect on the application of general federal criminal statutes.214
For example, the court in Blue noted that in United States v. Stone,215 it
had upheld federal jurisdiction over an assault on a Bureau of Indian
Affairs police officer for the same reason. 216 Although "Stone involved
a crime of a peculiarly federal nature," the court in Blue "adopt[ed] its
interpretation of [the IGCA] as generally valid and applicable to all
general federal criminal laws." 2 17 The court recognized that Blue's
argument was supported by United States v. Quiver, where, again, the Su-
preme Court held that "the enumeration in the [Major Crimes Act] of
certain offenses as applicable to Indians in the reservations, carries with it
some implication of a purpose to exclude others." 2 18 Nonetheless, the
court read Quiver as applying to "internal and social tribal matter[s],"
and to "the relations of Indians among themselves," and not as limiting
federal jurisdiction over generally applicable laws.219 Interestingly, the
court recognized the importance of tribal sovereignty, and observed that
if a generally applicable law's enforcement in Indian Country threatened
a "particular Indian right or policy," in particular, treaty rights, then the
law may not apply in Indian Country unless it specifically so provides.220
211. United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383,384 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975).
216. United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing United v. Stone, 506 F.2d
561,563 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975)). See also United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d
730, 737 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that statute against unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
applies in Indian country); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 457-59 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that
federal prohibition on hunting bald eagles was not applicable on reservation); United States v.
McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 16 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 1163, which prohibits converting
tribal funds, is applicable because it "makes certain actions criminal regardless of where they are
committed"); United States v. Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305, 1332 (D. Minn. 1995) (noting that generally
applicable federal criminal laws apply in Indian Country, despite IGCA and Major Crimes Act).
217. Blue, 722 F.2d at 385.
218. Id. at 386 (citing United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606 (1916) (alteration by Court)).
219. Id. (citations omitted).
220. Id. (citing United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974)). See also United States v.
Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing exception to general applicability), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
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The court thought no such right or policy was implicated or infringed in
Blue's case, though.
The Sixth Circuit explicitly adopted the Eighth Circuit's approach
in Blue in United States v. Yannott.221 Leonard Yannott, an Indian,
pulled a sawed-off shotgun on a fellow guest at a party on the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians' reservation. 222 He was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession
of an unregistered firearm. 223 On appeal, Yannott claimed that his
indictment should have been quashed for lack of jurisdiction, for two
reasons. 224 First, he had already been punished by the tribal court, and
was therefore covered under the IGCA's exceptions; and second, neither
of the offenses for which he was convicted are enumerated in the Major
Crimes Act. 225 The Sixth Circuit, adopting the Eighth Circuit's reason-
ing in Blue, held that the IGCA and its exceptions apply only to enclave
laws. 226 The court also held that the Major Crimes Act "does not strip
the federal courts of jurisdiction of those crimes not enumerated . . .
federal courts retain jurisdiction over violations of federal laws of
general, non-territorial applicability."227
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have embraced, without
showing any particular reluctance or wariness, a surprisingly expansive
vision of federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. In this vision,
the IGCA and the Major Crimes Act accomplished little and count for
less: the IGCA and its exceptions limit only the applicability of federal
enclave law, and the Major Crimes Act-which, remember, was certainly
viewed as a significant statute when it was passed 228 -merely carves an
exception out of the IGCA's already small province for the enumerated
crimes. All generally applicable federal criminal laws apply in Indian
Country and to intra-Indian crimes; not just those laws which satisfy the
"overriding exception." 229
221. 42 F.3d 999 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
222. United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1001 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172
(1995).
223. Id. at 1001, 1002 (noting charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
224. Id. at 1003.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1003-04 (citing cases).
227. Yannott, 42 F.3d at 1004 (citing United States v. Young, 936 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.
1991)). Unlike the courts in Blue and Begay, the Sixth Circuit did not discuss any possible exceptions
to its holding, for example, for Indian treaty rights or policies central to sovereignty and self-
government.
228. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 962-64 (discussing Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883),
and public support for the Major Crimes Act).
229. According to the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, so long as these laws do not explicitly abrogate
treaty rights or tribal sovereignty, they need not protect a "peculiarly Federal interest" nor plainly
exhibit a specific intent to extend jurisdiction to Indian Country.
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B. THE SECOND AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS' APPROACH
In United States v. Begay, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the
Second Circuit's approach, 230 as outlined in United States v. Markie-
wicz.231 Like Begay, Markiewicz arose out of an intratribal political
dispute; the latter case occurred in the Oneida Indian Territory and
involved the operation of a bingo hall. 232 The Oneida Nation's bingo
hall was a "major center of activity" in the Territory. 233 Originally, the
bingo hall's general manager was the same person who ran the Territo-
ry's other businesses and was the Territory's Bureau of Indian Affairs
recognized representative to the federal government. 234 In February
1987 he was replaced by John Dyer, who in October 1987 stepped down
and whose duties were assumed by a three-person "business commit-
tee," with one representative from each of the Oneida Nation's three
clans. 235 As the committee's power and its clashes with other Nation
officials increased, many Oneidans grew wary.2 3 6 One of the problems
was that the committee was apparently using bingo hall revenues to pay
the salaries of people not employed at the bingo hall. 237 The dissension
grew, and internal tribal relations deteriorated. 238 The faction opposing
the committee even sought the help and advice of Oneidans from the
Nation's Canadian territory. 239 On one occasion, business committee
opponents damaged a gas station owned by the bingo hall's original
general manager (a business committee sympathizer). 240 On another,
they broke into the bingo hall and assaulted several Oneidans. 24 1 And
on another, they pressured a committee member to turn over the Na-
tion's checkbooks.242
In January 1988, the bingo hall's original general manager sued
several of the committee opponents behind these incidents, and a New
230. United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Benally v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995).
231. 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993). See generally John J.
Yered, Comment, Native American Subject to Jurisdiction of United States Courts for Crimes
Committed Against Another Native American on Indian Territories, 17 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 539
(1994) (discussing Markiewicz).
232. United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993).
233. Id. For the facts of the Markiewicz case, see id. at 793-97.
234. Id. at 794.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 794.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 795.
241. Id.
242. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 795.
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York federal district judge granted a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against further disruption and interference with
the operation of the bingo hall.243 Nonetheless, the day after the restrain-
ing order was issued, several of the Markiewicz defendants (committee
opponents) gathered at the bingo hall and divided the hall's revenues,
calling the money "back pay." 24 4 Finally, in the early morning of
February 21, 1988, they burned the hall to the ground.245
After a jury trial, the defendants were convicted of several offenses,
including conspiracy to steal tribal funds, conspiracy to violate the
federal anti-riot act, and conspiracy to "maliciously damage a building
used in interstate commerce through the use of fire or an explosion." 246
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered whether the district court had
properly exercised jurisdiction. In the district court, the defendants had
claimed that "with the exception of crimes specifically enumerated by
Congress, Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction over Indian-against-
Indian offenses committed on Indian territory."247 The district court
rejected this argument, reasoning-like the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits-that "federal criminal laws of general applicability apply even
where a Native American is both the defendant and the victim and the
acts complained of occurred on a reservation."248
The Second Circuit agreed that the district court had properly
exercised jurisdiction, but disagreed with the lower court's reasoning in
important respects.249 After reviewing the text and history of the IGCA
and the Major Crimes Act, the court concluded that, together, the two
statutes teach and require that "the relations of the Indians, among
themselves-the conduct of one toward another-is to be controlled by
the customs and laws of the tribe, save when Congress expressly or
clearly directs otherwise."250 The court, quoting Quiver, emphasized
that the Major Crimes Act's "enumeration . . . of certain offenses as
applicable to Indians in the reservations carries with it some implication
of a purpose to exclude others." 251 The district court, in the Second
243. Oneida Indian Nation v. Hill, No. 88-CV-29, 1988 WL 9302, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1988).
244. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 794-95.
245. Id. at 795.
246. Id. at 796-97.
247. Id. at 797.
248. Id.
249. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 797.
250. Id. at 798 (quoting United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602,605-06 (1916)) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has also stated that "reservation Indians may well have exclusive rights
of self-governance in purely intramural matters, unless Congress has removed those rights through
legislation explicitly directed at Indians." United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
251. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798 (quoting Quiver, 241 U.S. at 606). See also United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977) (noting that for intra-Indian crimes in Indian Country, only
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Circuit's view, had overlooked the significance of Quiver by holding that
all generally applicable federal criminal laws "apply of [their] own force
to the Indian territories." 252
The court in Markiewicz, candidly, to its credit, recognized that
other Circuits had taken the district court's approach, but insisted that an
"alternative approach" better served the Supreme Court's reading of
the Major Crimes Act in Quiver.253 The court suggested that federal
jurisdiction should extend only to those Indian-against-Indian crimes
which are either enumerated in the Major Crimes Act or which constitute
"peculiarly Federal" offenses. 254 This alternative approach was
supported, it reasoned, by at least three distinct lines of argument. 255
First, "[C]ongress apparently adopted this approach" in the 1976
Indian Crimes Act.256 Again, the legislative history noted an overriding
exception to the Major Crimes Act's general pattern of jurisdiction for
"crimes that are peculiarly Federal. 257 Thus, there is federal jurisdiction
when the offense is one such as assaulting a federal officer . . . or
defrauding the United States." 2 58 Congress, tellingly, did not identify a
blanket exception for all generally applicable federal criminal laws, only
peculiarly federal ones. Second, the court reasoned, this approach not
only better serves Quiver's teaching, but also accords with dicta from
United States v. Wheeler, in which the Supreme Court noted that "feder-
al criminal jurisdiction over Indians extends . . . to offenses as to which
those offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act may be tried in federal courts).
252. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 798.
253. Id. at 799.
254. Id. at 799-800. This statement seems to conflict with the court's recognition of the Quiver
principle that Indians control intra-tribal relations "save when Congress expressly or clearly directs
otherwise." Compare id. with Quiver, 241 U.S. at 605-06. The Markiewicz court believed that a
"generally applicable" federal law that creates a "peculiarly Federal" offense is either an exception
to the Quiver rule, or constitutes an express direction by Congress to intrude upon tribal matters.
Marjiewucz, 978 F.2d at 799-800.
255. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799-800.
256. Id. at 799. The Indian Crimes Act of 1976 expanded the list of enumerated Major Crimes to
include kidnapping; provided that the crimes of rape, assault with intent to commit rape, assault with a
dangerous weapon, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury were to be defined by federal, not
state, law; and amended 18 U.S.C. § 113 to define and prescribe punishment for assault resulting in
serious bodily injury. See generally HR. REP. No. 1038,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
257. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 799-800.
258. Id. (quoting HR. REP. No. 1038, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1125, 1127).
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there is an independent federal interest to be protected." 259 The Su-
preme Court in Wheeler, the Markiewicz court thought, had "recog-
nize[d] Quiver's conclusion that federal jurisdiction does not exist over
Indian-against-Indian crimes that congress fails to enumerate, except
where such offenses constitute 'peculiarly Federal' crimes, and the
prosecution of such offenses would protect an independent federal
interest ."260
Finally, the court could point to supporting decisions from the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits. 261 In United States v. Welch,262 the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense of engaging in a sexual act with a child under thirteen years of
age .263 The Fourth Circuit observed that the offense was by an Indian
against another Indian, occurred in Indian Country, and was not enumer-
ated in the Major Crimes Act. 264 The court followed Wheeler, emphasiz-
ing that "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status." 26 5 The court also noted that "[w]hen there is a
crime by an Indian against another Indian within Indian country only
those offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act may be tried in the
federal courts." 2 66 Although in Welch the court did not specifically
address the scope of generally applicable federal criminal laws, it strong-
ly reaffirmed the Quiver principle that the Major Crimes Act's limit on
federal criminal jurisdiction was intended to be a meaningful one.267
259. Id. at 800 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 n.32 (1978)). The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the Markiewicz court's reading of Wheeler, noting that the Court in Wheeler,
after stating the above quoted principle, referred back to a previous footnote, which stated that
"(flederal jurisdiction also extends to ... crimes over which there is federal jurisdiction regardless of
whether an Indian is involved, such as assaulting a federal officer." United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d
486, 500 n.20 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93 (1995)
(quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 531 n.30). The Begay court also noted with approval the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978
(1975) which held that federal jurisdiction was proper for cases involving a violation of "laws of the
United States that make actions criminal wherever committed." Begay, 42 F.3d at 499 n.19.
260. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 800.
261. Id. at 799-800.
262. 822 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1987).
263. United States v. Welch, 822 F.2d 460, 462 (4th Cir. 1987). The defendant was charged
under the Assimilative Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act, and North Carolina General Statutes §
14-27.4(a)(1), with first-degree sexual offenses, and § 14-27.2(a)(1), with first-degree rape. Welch,
822 F.2d at 461-62.
264. Welch, 822 F.2d at 465.
265. Id. at 464-65 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
266. Id. at 464 (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,643 (1977)).
267. See United States v. Walkingeagle, 974 F.2d 551, 554-56 (4th Cir. 1992) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "sole" exceptions to IGCA's intra-Indian provision are the enumerated Major
Crimes, but admitting that federal courts "might" have jurisdiction over a generally-applicable crime
like "assaulting a federal officer"); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (citing Welch for proposition that federal courts have no jurisdiction over "minor" crimes in
Indian Country), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).
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The Markiewicz court also relied on the Seventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Smith.268 There, the court recognized the "analytic
difficulties" in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' approach to the interac-
tion between the IGCA and the Major Crimes Act.269 In Smith, the
defendant appealed his conviction for forcibly assaulting an officer of
the federal government performing his official duties. 270 Smith had
resisted the attempt of a special BIA officer to serve him with a sum-
mons.271 The trial judge first suggested that such a minor case should
not have been brought in the first place, but, nonetheless, he found Smith
guilty of "technical assault" and fined him ten dollars.272 On appeal,
Smith argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
this unenumerated offense, by one Indian against another, in Indian
Country. 273 Specifically, Smith, a Menominee Indian enrolled in the
Tribe, argued that the IGCA's exception for intra-Indian crimes, coupled
with the fact that simple assault is not enumerated in the Major Crimes
Act, left intact the Tribe's exclusive jurisdiction to punish the offense.274
In response, the court first stated that although Quiver supports the
proposition that the Major Crimes Act's enumeration of certain crimes
implies an intent to exclude jurisdiction over others, the Act might not
"preclude[] district court jurisdiction of a simple assault where the
victim is simultaneously an enrolled member of an Indian tribe and an
employee of the Indian Field Service." 275 The court noted the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits' position that the IGCA's exceptions do not apply to
generally applicable criminal laws, but agreed with Smith that these
Circuits had read the IGCA too narrowly. 276 Unfortunately for Smith,
the other Circuits' mistakes did not help him: The court pointed to the
legislative history of the Indian Crimes Act of 1976,277 which identified
the "overriding exception . . . for crimes that are peculiarly Federal ...
such as assaulting a federal officer." 278 Turning to Smith's argument
that Quiver protects tribal sovereignty over intra-Indian offenses, the
court insisted that the Supreme Court's opinions provided no "clear
guidelines" on the problem. 279 Smith insisted that prior decisions'
268. 562 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
269. United States v. Smith, 562 F.2d 453,456 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
270. 18U.S.C.§ I11.
271. Smith, 562 F.2d at 455.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 456.
276. Smith, 562 F.2d at 456.
277. See HR. REP. No. 1038, supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of Indian Crimes Act).
278. Smith, 562 F.2d at 456 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 458.
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interpretation of the Major Crimes Act indicated the "enormous push
toward Indian self-government and Indian sovereignty." 28 0 The court
refused to conclude that the tribal court's jurisdiction was exclusive,
especially given Congress's apparent adoption of the "overriding
exception" for "peculiarly Federal" offenses. 28l
The Seventh Circuit took up this problem again recently in United
States v. Funmaker,282 yet another politically charged bingo hall manage-
ment case. 28 3 Funmaker, a member of the Wisconsin Winnebago Indian
Tribe, was associated with one of two rival factions (the "Jones faction;"
the other was the "Six Pac" faction) competing for control of the
Tribe's Ho Chunk Bingo Hall and Casino. 28 4 A district court had
ordered Six Pac to stop managing the casino until a new services contract
was approved, but Six Pac bristled at complying. 28 5 The Jones faction
was convinced that Six Pac was plotting to take over the hall and worried
that they could not defend the hall from Six Pac. 286 As a result, the
Jones faction decided, as a preemptive strike, to destroy the building. 287
Funmaker, a member of a tribal clan which had historically acted as
"enforcers" for tribal leaders, volunteered to burn down the building
rather than let it fall into rival hands.288 His attempt at political sabotage
via Molotov cocktail was foiled by the bingo hall's sprinkler system, and
Funmaker eventually pled guilty to charges of attempting to destroy by
fire a building involved in interstate commerce and using a destructive
device in relation to a crime of violence.289
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that although general federal
laws usually do apply to Indians, in cases where application of the statute
would affect Indian treaty rights, or affect rights essential to self-govern-
ment of "intramural" matters, Congress must clearly express its inten-
tion to interfere with these rights. 290 The court held, however, that
Funmaker's actions clearly went beyond purely intra-tribal matters in
that they were directed at a building used in interstate commerce: "One
need look no further than the Constitution to see that the federal govern-
ment has a unique interest in the protection of goods in interstate
280. Id.
281. Id. The court also implied that it agreed with the trial court's opinion that the federal gov-
ernment should not have prosecuted this case, for policy reasons. See id.
282. 10 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1993).
283. United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993).
284. Id. at 1329-30.
285. Id. at 1329.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1329.
289. Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i), 924(c)).
290. Id. at 1330-31 (echoing the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' "treaty rights" exception).
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commerce." 29 1 In other words, the "building in commerce" provided
the federal nexus or "hook" needed for federal criminal jurisdiction. 292
Now, on one reading, the Seventh Circuit seemed simply to adopt the
Ninth Circuit's position: general federal criminal laws apply unless they
abrogate treaty rights or explicitly infringe on Indian self-govern-
ment. 293 However, the Seventh Circuit actually adopted the Second
Circuit's approach in Markiewicz. Rather than asking whether the law
infringed on tribal self-government, the court looked for a peculiarly
federal interest. 29 4 In Funmaker, that interest was the United States'
"unique interest in the protection of goods in interstate commerce." 295
Thus, the Seventh Circuit, like the Second, went beyond and improved
upon the more narrow focus on treaty rights and intramural affairs.
C. CONTRASTING THE Two APPROACHES
To be sure, the distinction between the Markiewicz and Begay
approaches is a fine one.296 Under both approaches, almost all federal
291. Id. at 1331 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The court also rejected Funmaker's claim
that his federal prosecution violated the "political question and act of state doctrines." Id. at 1332-33.
Although these arguments were unsuccessful, they point to a concern that should always remain in
view when analyzing the extent of federal jurisdiction in Indian Country, namely, the danger of
intruding on the political decisions and life of a separate, albeit dependent, sovereign.
292. Under United States v. Lopez, of course, Congress clearly has the constitutional authority to
"regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce," to "protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, persons or things in interstate commerce," and to regulate "activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce." 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 1639-30 (1995) (citations omitted).
293. See United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d
1288, 1291 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating that general laws apply "unless there exists some treaty right which
exempts the Indian from the operation of the particular statutes in question"). Note, however, that this
decision predates Congress's apparent adoption of the "peculiarly federal" requirement in 1976. See
HR. REp. No. 1038, supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Indian
Crimes Act).
294. See United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "Fun-
maker's actions extended beyond purely intramural matters").
295. Id.
296. One district court has suggested that, in fact, there is no such split. See United States v. Finn,
919 F. Supp. 1305, 1332 (D. Minn. 1995) ("[wlith uniformity, the Courts have rejected any such
contention, and have concluded that the generally applicable provisions of the Federal Criminal Code
govern .... (citations omitted)). In my view, the court in Finn misread the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1001 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995),
equating its approach with that of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The First Circuit recently recognized
the split in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 593 (1st Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 19,
1996) (No. 96-5631). The court noted that federal criminal laws of general applicability may involve
"independent federal interest[s]," id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 n.32
(1978)), but that "it is unclear that one is required" for jurisdiction in Indian Country. Id. (comparing
Markiewicz and Begay). The court noted the different approaches taken by the Begay, Funmaker,
and Markiewicz courts, but held that even if "an independent federal interest" were required, that
requirement was satisfied. Id. It is not clear that the Second Circuit has wholly embraced the Mar-
kiewicz approach. In a recent case, Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2nd
Cir. 1996), the court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) was a generally
applicable law which applied to a tribal businesses, notwithstanding the alleged infringement on tribal
sovereignty. The court emphasized that OSHA did not affect tribal self-governance over intramural
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criminal laws apply in Indian Country, to intra-Indian crimes and to
crimes involving non-Indians, 297 and, under both approaches, if such a
law abrogates or infringes on a tribe's treaty rights, Congress's intent to
do so must be clear for the law to have effect in Indian Country. 298 But
there are important differences. First, the Markiewicz approach, like the
Supreme Court's decision in Quiver, reveals a recognition that the Major
Crimes Act and the IGCA's various exceptions actually mean something:
"[T]he enumeration . . .of certain offenses as applicable to Indians in
the reservations carries with it some implication of a purpose to exclude
others" and "the relations of the Indians, among themselves-the
conduct of one toward another-is to be controlled by the customs and
laws of the tribe, save when Congress expressly or clearly directs other-
wise." 2 99  This approach is incompatible with the oft-repeated, glib
assertions that the Major Crimes Act and IGCA are only about enclave
laws and that general laws apply in Indian Country just like anyplace
else.300 The second important difference, the one I wish to emphasize, is
that the Markiewicz approach puts on the United States the burden of
showing that the extension of a generally applicable criminal law into
Indian Country vindicates a peculiarly federal interest, while the Begay
approach effectively requires an Indian defendant to prove a violation of
his Tribe's treaty rights, thus giving him a very narrow "window of
opportunity" for contesting jurisdiction. 30 1 Consider the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Funmaker: The court could have followed Begay
and made Funmaker prove that federal jurisdiction "would affect rights
affairs. Id. at 181-82. Importantly, the court rejected the argument that a clear statement from
Congress was required to bring the Tribe under OSHA, and reasoned instead that a federal regulatory
scheme which is silent on its application to Indians would be presumed to apply "unless it affects
exclusive rights of governance over 'purely intramural matters."' Id. at 179. This case is contrary to
the position I advocate in this article. I note, however, that OSHA is a regulatory scheme, not a
criminal statute and so localism values are, arguably, not as threatened. See supra, at notes 41-56.
297. So, as I suggested above, both approaches are wrong; that is, they are both inconsistent with
first principles of Federal Indian Law.
298. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486,498-99 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress may
abrogate power by treaty or statute), cert. denied sub nom., Benally v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 93
(1995); United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (similar). The courts'
frequent casual references to the abrogation of treaties, admittedly within Congress's power, should
bother those who agree with Justice Black, who said, in a different context, "[glreat nations, like great
men, should keep their word." Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142
(1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
299. United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 798 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.,
Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993) (quoting United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06
(1916)).
300. See, e.g., Begay, 42 F.3d at 498 ("The Major Crimes Act, deals only with the application of
federal enclave laws to Indians and has no bearing on federal laws of nationwide applicability ....").
301. Cf. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (placing burden on Tribe to show
that tribal civil jurisdiction is necessary to tribal self-government).
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essential to self-governance of intramural matters." 302 Instead,303 the
court was persuaded by the United States that the prosecution of Fun-
maker protected a peculiarly federal interest in protecting interstate
commerce. 304 The clear, if unarticulated, allocation of burdens in
Funmaker and Markiewicz 30 5 meant that these courts recognized that,
while Congress can extend its criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country,
while it does have "plenary power" in Indian affairs, the initial presump-
tion is always for tribal self-government.
Why does it matter where the burden lies? Because tribal sovereign-
ty is a matter of structural and institutional, not only individual, concern.
Our Constitution set up a political structure of diffused and limited
power; it is not merely a litany of individual rights. 306 The Begay
approach requires an individual defendant, who may be indigent and
unfamiliar with law and procedure (let alone issues of constitutional
structure) to vindicate not only his own concrete, immediate interest in
limiting federal jurisdiction, but also the more amorphous treaty and
political interests of the relevant Tribe. This allocation of responsibility
not only overburdens the defendant, it also exposes the integrity of tribal
sovereignty to erosion through attrition, to death by a thousand plea
bargains. The allocation of jurisdiction between the United States and
the Tribes has an independent, constitutional, and crucial significance,
beyond the needs of a particular defendant in a particular case. A
defendant's consent to, or his failure or inability to fight, federal juris-
diction does not remove the injury to the integrity of tribal sovereignty
worked by the expansion of federal jurisdiction. 30 7 The Markiewicz
302. Funmaker, 10 F.3d at 1330-31 (citing Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932-34
(7th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)).
303. The court made it clear that it was taking an alternative approach: "Without addressing the
question of whether the decision to set ablaze tribal property involves exclusive rights of self-govern-
ance ..... Id.
304. Id. The court noted that if Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham affected commerce, then the
Tribe's tourist-attraction bingo hall did as well. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964)).
305. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 798-802 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom., Beglen v. United States, 506 U.S. 1086 (1993) (analyzing jurisdictional issues).
306. Again, to be sure, our federal structure was designed, in part, to protect individual rights.
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (discussing first principles and separation of
power); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[Tlhe Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals."); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Flederalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.").
307. In many contexts, the Supreme Court has upheld constitutionally-required checks and limits
even in the face of "consented to" infringements of them. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating provision authorizing congressional veto of executive
decision even though President and Congress "consented" to infringement of their powers); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down statute giving congressional officers power to appoint
members of Federal Election Commission). As the Court once noted, "[a) citizen's constitutional
rights can hardly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be." Lucas v.
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approach, appropriately, charges the federal government with justifying
expansions of its jurisdiction and therefore better protects both defen-
dants and tribes. The health of tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty is not
contingent on the vigilance of accused individuals who, quite understand-
ably, may have their own interests, and not those of the Tribes, in the
front of their minds. The United States should therefore have to show
not only that a prosecution does not violate tribal treaty rights, but also
to advance, as the Markiewicz court held, a strong and "peculiarly
Federal" interest before intruding into intra-tribal disputes, before
prosecuting intra-Indian crimes in Indian Country which are not enumer-
ated in the Major Crimes Act.308 Given Congress's plenary power in
Indian affairs, this approach would not hamstring federal power, but
only require Congress to be up front and candid when it exercises its
power, as it often has, to the detriment of Indian self-determination.
VI. CONCLUSION: THOUGHTS ON LOPEZ, CONSPIRACY, AND
TRIBAL POLITICS
I said at the outset that Lopez has prompted a renewed interest in,
and concern for, federalism and localism values. I want to conclude my
discussion with some thoughts about what this Lopez-inspired renewal
might mean for the criminal side of Federal Indian Law. And because
this Article has focused on the federal conspiracy statute, I will briefly
highlight some special concerns raised by the prospect of ever-expand-
ing federal conspiracy jurisdiction.
A. DISCIPLINING THE PROSECUTOR'S DARLING
In Part V.C, above, I noted that we should prefer the Markiewicz
allocation of burdens over Begay's because it is more consistent with
Federal Indian Law's first principles and because it better guards impor-
tant structural constitutional values. There is another reason, one which
applies with particular force to the federal conspiracy statute: conspiracy
needs all the narrowing and limiting it can get. Granted, the possibilities
of abuses of discretion are real with all criminal statutes. Nevertheless,
the conspiracy statute, because of its vagueness, breadth, and malleability,
and the potential for abuse by overly-creative federal prosecutors, poses
special risks to tribal sovereignty. First, if we take the Major Crimes Act
Forty-fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,736-37 (1964).
308. Professor Alex Tallchief Skibine makes a similar point, arguing that Congress should only be
able to pass legislation interfering with tribal self-government when it can identify an overriding
national interest in doing so, and that the burden of proving this interest should be on Congress. See
Skibine, supra note 33, at 571-72 (criticizing implied divestiture theory in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,201-06 (1978)).
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seriously, its enumeration of certain crimes reflects an intent to exclude
other crimes. But if courts are not careful, prosecutors might use the
conspiracy statute to expand this list, to pursue convictions not only for
the enumerated substantive crimes, but for conspiracies (including
unsuccessful ones) to commit those crimes.309 Insofar as conspiracy is a
possible tool for circumventing the limitations of the Major Crimes Act's
enumeration, the conspiracy statute's reach should be an item of particu-
lar concern.
Second, the conspiracy statute is perhaps uniquely worrisome
because of its historical and current use in politically-charged cases. The
Navajo Riots in Begay can reasonably be viewed as the culmination of a
political struggle (or, perhaps, as the last gasp of a corrupt regime). As
the defense attorney for one of the Begay defendants noted, the "Navajo
Riot" was about "preserv[ing] a democracy. "310 We may quibble with
this characterization in this particular case, but, surely, it is not entirely
off the mark. The defendants in Begay did commit crimes, but against
whom? Which sovereign's peace was disturbed? Perhaps we should be
reluctant to grant the federal government power to punish agreements
and even plots that take place within the confines of the vast Navajo
Nation, and on other reservations, when these agreements are directed at
intra-tribal, political ends? The underlying disputes in Funmaker and
Markiewicz were also essentially political. Control over a bingo hall may
seem trivial to some, but such enterprises are important to the Tribes'
political power and are often the key to the Tribes' economic survival.
Now, I am not saying that intra-Indian "political" plots are immune
from the federal criminal law. Should these agreements culminate in
serious crime, of course, the Major Crimes Act authorizes federal prose-
cution. Or, as in Markiewicz and Funmaker, prosecution will often be
easily justified by the "peculiarly Federal interests" approach. I am
saying, though, that many of the concerns about tribal self-government
and self-determination have special force when it comes to the conspira-
cy statute.
309. As I discussed above, prosecutors should not be able to get away with this tactic, given that
the crime of conspiracy has always been viewed as distinct from its object. Recall the court's warning
in United States v. Narcia: "If the government may properly charge defendants with attempt, the
government arguably may charge them with aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or various other crimes
as well. All of these crimes are beyond the scope of the Major Crimes Act and, as such, may not be
charged by the government." 776 F. Supp. 491, 494 (D. Ariz. 1991) (emphasis added). Recall also
that even the court in Markiewicz seemed to assume that federal jurisdiction over an enumerated
crime such as arson carried with it jurisdiction over a conspiracy to commit arson. 978 F.2d at 800-02.
310. Davenport, supra note 174, at B6.
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B. TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE LOPEZ RENEWAL
As I asked at the outset, what does Lopez mean for the Tribes, and
for those concerned with preserving meaningful self-government in
Indian Country? I will offer here only a few, brief, comments.311 First,
Lopez underscores the quite modest nature of my proposal. Remember,
Lopez did not really question this century's vast expansion of federal
power via the Commerce Clause; 312 it merely reminded us that there are,
somewhere, limits to that power, 313 if only that Congress must plausibly
assert that it is regulating commerce when it regulates commerce. 314
Similarly, under the Markiewicz approach, Congress can always draft
criminal statutes which apply to Indians in Indian County, so long as it is
clear about it. After all, the Supreme Court has long applied a "plain"
or "clear statement rule" when Congress steps into traditional spheres of
state control.315 Such a rule "assures that the legislature has in fact
faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the
judicial decision," 316 critical matters such as upholding our historical
commitment to tribal sovereignty and self-determination. And even
when Congress's purpose is not clear, a showing by the government of a
clear and peculiarly federal interest in prosecution will permit jurisdic-
tion in a given case. Attentiveness to first principles of Federal Indian
Law, and a respectful if rebuttable presumption against federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country will not, then, seriously hamstring federal
law enforcement efforts.
Lopez also suggests that, when looking for a peculiarly federal
interest upon which to hang the hat of federal criminal jurisdiction over
intra-Indian crime, we should subject proffered interests to some type of
311. I will not attempt, as some commentators have already done, the difficult task of reinventing
an entire area of the law in light of Lopez. See, eg., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending
After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995).
312. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor emphasized the conservative nature of the Court's holding.
See Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing holding as "necessary though
limited"). Justice Thomas would have gone further. Id. at 1650-51 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At an
appropriate juncture, I think we must modify our Commerce Clause jurisprudence.").
313. Wherever the limit is, the "distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local,"
must be preserved. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
314. The Court did not require "findings" about the relation between a regulated activity and
interstate commerce, but it did suggest that such findings make it easier for the Court to determine
whether there is indeed such a relation. Id. at 1631-32.
315. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.15 (1996) (noting that "principles of
federalism, require us always to apply the clear statement rule before we consider the constitutional
question whether Congress has the power to abrogate [States' sovereign immunity]"); id. at 1185
(stating similarly that "a plain statement is required when Congress pre-empts" States' powers)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (noting that Congress may not limit state power via federal
statute without a plain statement of its intent).
316. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
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heightened scrutiny, to a hard look. 317 Recall that in Lopez, the govern-
ment argued that the Gun Free School Zones Act was valid because gun
possession in or near a local school "does indeed substantially affect
interstate commerce."318 The Court rejected this argument, 319 rightly
noting that "if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are
hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate." 320 Of necessity, the enumeration in our
Constitution of the federal government's powers requires that the grants
of these powers be interpreted in a way that allows of some real limit,
somewhere, on the reach of that power. The same is true of the peculiar-
ly federal interests required before a general federal criminal law may be
applied in Indian Country. Not every interest can be peculiarly federal,
or the limitation has no effect. Just as the Commerce Clause must not be
interpreted so as to obliterate the "distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local," 32 1 first principles of Indian Law require
that the federal government either clearly exercise, via explicit drafting
of criminal statutes, its power to carve out additional pieces of the
Tribes' inherent sovereignty, or advance real and peculiarly federal
interests justifying the incursion in a particular case.
As I cautioned at the outset, Lopez will not likely be used to limit
federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country. The Interstate and
Indian Commerce Clauses are, or have been read to be, different animals.
But Lopez's first principle- "The Constitution creates a Federal Govern-
ment of enumerated powers" 322 - applies in this context; indeed, it may
apply with even greater force when it comes to the Tribes, who, although
their sovereignty and independence continues to erode, have always been
recognized as distinct, as "under," but not wholly "subject to," the rule
of our national government. I propose that when reflecting on the
importance of Lopez to the story of the nationalization, federalization,
and perhaps devolution of the criminal law, and to the principle that
constitutionally-limited powers protects not only the rights of individu-
als, but the diversity and richness of communities, we remember also the
importance of vigilance in guarding the integrity of the Tribes' criminal
317. Newton, supra note 41, at 241-47 (discussing justifications for heightened scrutiny).
Newton notes, following John Hart Ely, that the courts may have a duty to intervene when the politi-
cal process has broken down, and failed to protect minorities. Id. at 245. Newton also notes that
"tribes ... have some rights of local self-government that have been recognized by the Constitution
[which] cannot be infringed by government... without an overriding justification." Id. at 261.
318. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,1632 (1995).
319. Id. at 1634. But see, id. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing relation between
education and commerce).
320. Id. at 1632.
321. Id. at 1634.
322. Id. at 1626.
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jurisdiction, and of the Tribes' need and right to speak their communi-
ties' values through their own criminal law.
C. THOUGHTS ON SUBSIDIARITY
Our federalism allocates power "vertically" between the States and
the federal government. The Indian Tribes are in many ways an anoma-
ly in this system; it is not quite clear how they "fit in" to our Constitu-
tion's scheme. 323 Courts and commentators will continue to struggle for
the answer to this problem. 324 It may well be, though, that the complicat-
ed maze of Federal Indian Law cannot be neatly assimilated into our
constitutional law of federalism, that conquered nations will never
function like the confederated co-equal States.325 What then?
As I said earlier, I expect Lopez to revive interest not only in the
constitutional law of federalism, but also in the principles and ideals of
localism and subsidiarity. In Catholic social thought, which has greatly
influenced the political theory underlying the European Community,326
subsidiarity embodies the following principle:
[J]ust as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and
commit to the community at large what private enterprise and
industry can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice, a grave evil
and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher
organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be
performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. This is a
fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and
unchanged .... 327
Subsidiarity recognizes, when necessary, the importance of strong,
centralized political authority but advises, when possible, that we capture
the richness and benefits of creative policy experiments at the local,
community level. 328 Professor Bermann has identified at least four other
323. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 1989 HARVARD INDIAN LAW
SYMPOSIUM 15, 17 (1990) (noting that the Tribes' "existence and role in the federal union is difficult to
explain and reconcile with western notions of governmental legitimacy upon which American
democracy rests").
324. See generally Monette, supra note 12 (discussing relationship between United States and
Tribes).
325. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) ("Tribal reserva-
tions are not States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it
treacherous to import to one notions ... that are properly applied to the other.").
326. See Bermann, supra note 4 (discussing subsidiarity).
327. PoPE Pius XI, QUADRAGESiMO ANNo § 28 (1931), reprinted in JosEPH HussLEiN, THE CHRISTIAN
SocIAL MANIFEsTo 304 (1931).
328. W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American Federalism
Compared, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 61,66 (1995).
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ends served by the subsidiarity principle. 329 First, subsidiarity promotes
both individual and community self-determination and accountability *330
In fact, community self-determination is tightly connected to the account-
ability of that community to its members. The closer the individual's
voice to the community's decision makers, the more accountable and
responsible the community. Second, as I discussed above, subsidiarity
and localism allow a community to express its norms, to define itself
through its aspirations and prohibitions, and to preserve its identity in a
way particular to itself.331 The community speaks its own values through
its locally-determined laws, it does not merely administer (except, of
course, when necessary) the norms of the central authority. Here, we see
a connection with the discussion of the overriding exception to the
Quiver principle for peculiarly federal laws, and with my proposal that
the federal government bear the burden of showing when its laws ought
to be enforced at the expense of tribal jurisdiction. Third, subsidiarity,
like federalism, promotes diversity of expression among communities,
but it limits diverse expressions when they are incompatible with funda-
mental, overriding, central objectives. 332 We only have to think of the
American experience with racism to see the give-and-take that subsidi-
arity must take into account. 333 Finally, subsidiarity respects, when
possible, the internal lawgiving structures within local communities. 334
Like American Federalism, the subsidiarity principle protects
individual liberties through the diffusion of coercive power and the
"clearing out" of space for individual and community self-definition
and flourishing at the local level. 335 But the two systems are not the
same; the principles of subsidiarity may not translate into or map neatly
onto the lexicon of American federalism. 336 Subsidiarity, in a sense,
goes beyond federalism; under subsidiarity, not only is power diffused,
but there is a systemic preference-indeed, a moral preference-for
329. Bermann, supra note 4, at 339-44.
330. Id. at 340.
331. Id. at 341.
332. Id. at 341-42.
333. The Indian Civil Rights Act, which imposes several of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights on
tribal courts, is another example. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (1994) (granting constitutional rights
and privilege of habeas corpus).
334. Bermann, supra note 4, at 342-43.
335. Vause, supra note 328 at 67. See also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995)
(stating that our separation of "authority 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties' (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). Of course, this
"clearing out" need not entail adopting the atomistic ideology of the unencumbered self. Far from it.
Individuals are situated, within their communities, and this situation is what makes possible their own
flourishing. See generally MARY ANN GLENDoN, RiGHTs TALK (1991).
336. See generally Bermann, supra note 4; Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism" in the European
Community and the United States: A Rose by Any Other Name ... 17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 389
(1994); Vause, supra note 328.
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decision making at the local level.337 Unlike federalism, subsidiarity is
not, in the United States, an enforceable legal or constitutional norm. 338
It is rather, in Justice Scalia's words, a "desideratum of policy," 339 a
maxim, or an aesthetic preference. Therefore, although many scholars
interested in localism and community have suggested ways to put this
"desideratum" of policy into practice, 340 the United States, as Professor
Bermann concludes, has not yet put subsidiarity to any specific and
concrete use.341
In any event, scholars of Federal Indian Law have not yet exploited
the rich possibilities for enlivening tribal sovereignty which the subsidiar-
ity principle may offer. I do not attempt to do so here, but wish only to
point out that the approach I have suggested for limiting the reach of
generally applicable federal criminal laws is one which resonates both
with the first principles of Our Federalism and with the long and rich
tradition of Catholic and European subsidiarity. Indeed subsidiarity,
with its emphasis on the moral and social good, not merely the efficien-
cy, of local decision making by autonomous communities, may have
more to offer the Tribes than does Our Federalism. It may well be that
the most hopeful possibilities for the rejuvenation of the Tribes as
political communities remain untapped.
337. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 404 ("[Although federalism conveys a general sense of
vertical distribution, or balance, or power, it is not generally understood as expressing a preference
for any particular distribution of that power .... "). Professor Bermann further notes that "U.S.
federalism places greater emphasis on the presence of an overall balance of power between the
federal government and the states than on respect for any single rule for allocating competencies
among the different levels of government." Id. at 450.
338. See generally id. at 403-55 (discussing federalism and subsidiarity).
339. See id. at 447 n.464 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, Subsidiarity a l'Americaine: C'est a
Dire Preemption, in MAASnMcIrr, SusmiLAsrry AND ITAuAN-EC RELATIONS 4,4 (1992)).
340. See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, U. PENN. L. REV. 1787 (1995);
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795 (1996); Michael
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI, L. REv. 1484, 1493-1500
(1987).
341. Bermann, supra note 4, at 447. Professor Gardbaum, however, has drawn on the subsid-
iarity principle in outlining his "alternative model of constitutional federalism." Gardbaum, supra note
340, at 802, 831-36.
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